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Abstract 
Alberta’s oil sands constitute one of the largest and most contentious industrial extraction sites of 
our time. While the ecological and geopolitical effects of extraction in northern Alberta attract 
global attention, the local politics of energy development are relatively understudied. This 
ethnographic research deepens understanding of the processes of energy governance in Alberta.  
Based in Fort McMurray, at the heart of the oil sands, I employed institutional 
ethnography to investigate the changing political processes and social negotiations that surround 
energy extraction in northern Alberta. My anthropological research was based in the Mikisew 
Cree First Nation Government and Industry Relations Office. Mikisew has navigated a variety of 
legal and political spaces to protect their treaty and Aboriginal rights, and to enhance their self-
determination. From May to September 2017, I engaged in participant observation, open-ended 
interviews, document and policy analysis, and a focus group.  
The body of my thesis comprises three chapters, which investigate: 
• The shifting landscape of energy governance in northern Alberta, highlighting emergent 
trends such as regulatory capture and engagement-oriented reforms. 
• The changing strategies espoused by Indigenous communities in the oil sands to defend their 
rights and interests, and more specifically, Mikisew’s political mobilization. 
• Mikisew’s experience advocating at UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee. 
I argue that while attempts are being made to enhance the participatory capacity of 
energy governance in northern Alberta, resource extraction in the region is managed by a 
relatively closed community of experts, resulting in the discounting of Indigenous voices and 
rights. In order to combat the traditionally closed practice of energy governance in Alberta, 
Indigenous mobilization has become increasingly sophisticated, growing in capacity and 
complexity. Mobilization strategies primarily comprise litigation, government consultation, 
industry negotiation processes, and advocacy. These strategies are strategically pursued and 
deployed in contextually dependent manners. 
The imperative of reconciling Indigenous rights, environmental sustainability, and 
Canada’s energy needs is ever increasing. Critical social research helps elucidate these trade-
offs, as well as the manners in which Alberta’s governance regimes negotiate the costs and 
benefits of oil sands extraction. My participatory research illuminates current shortcomings in 
the management of energy extraction in northern Alberta, while exploring the current realities of 
 iii 
Indigenous political mobilization. Shedding light on the governance of Alberta’s oil sands region 
will help foster sustainable and equitable development in Canada. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
In the 19th century, the discovery of valuable resources in northern Canada added to the rising 
impetus for the Canadian government to treatise with local Indigenous communities (Fumoleau 
[1975] 2004).1 As a result, Treaty 8 was negotiated in 1899. Over 115 years later, industrial 
extraction continues to drive policy and human organization in the region. Indeed, Alberta’s past 
and present are deeply entangled in the energy sector and its governance. Alberta’s oil reserves 
are the third largest in the world, surpassed only by Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. In 2016, 
Alberta’s oil sands produced about 2.5 million barrels of crude bitumen per day (Alberta Energy 
Regulator 2017a). The region’s oil sands possess enormous potential in terms of oil production 
and profit (Alberta Energy and Utilities Board 2004). The oil sands underlie 142,200 square 
kilometres of northern Alberta, covered largely by boreal forest (Alberta Energy n.d.), and 
spanning the traditional territory of Cree, Dene, and Métis peoples.  
Industrial activity in Alberta has garnered international attention and debate. While some 
celebrate the oil sands as a key source of “ethical oil” (Levant 2011) in an age of global energy 
insecurity, concerns are rising about the environmental and social costs of bitumen extraction. 
Local perspectives on energy extraction are not given equal consideration relative to 
macroeconomic interests. Yet these voices are critical in assessing the extent to which energy 
governance regimes take the environmental, social, and economic impacts of energy extraction 
into account (Westman 2013). Energy governance refers to institutions’ management of land use 
for fossil fuel extraction (Van de Graaf and Colgan 2016: 2). In northern Alberta, the 
institutional complex of energy governance consists primarily of a wide range of regulatory and 
consultative processes, pertaining most significantly to the oil sands region. Governance in the 
region entangles provincial and federal governments, Indigenous communities, private firms, and 
other stakeholders – such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and landowners – in a 
wide range of political practices. These governance arrangements have real life impacts and 
consequences, influencing human-environment interactions (e.g., by regulating land use and 
resource access) in northern Alberta. Energy governance is imbued with conflicting ideas about                                                         
1 The term “Indigenous” will be used throughout this document, mirroring the contemporary shift toward 
“Indigenous” as a widely preferred term tied to internationally recognized legal rights (Daes 2008). The 
title “Indigenous” refers to peoples with long traditional occupation of and connection to a territory, who 
are culturally, politically and historically distinctive, and are now under pressure as minorities in a settler 
society (Coates 2004). Indigenous peoples are those who self-identify as such.  
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progress, sustainability, and the public interest. While my research is based in the Mikisew Cree 
First Nation’s Government and Industry Relations (GIR) office, my ethnographic fieldwork has 
provided insights into broader sectoral issues and realities, as I engaged with industry and 
government representatives, and a number of other Indigenous communities’ consultation teams, 
at length throughout the four months of fieldwork. My placement with the GIR in Fort 
McMurray did not ultimately result in research that centred solely on Mikisew or other 
Indigenous communities in the oil sands region. Rather, by accompanying MCFN’s staff as they 
mobilized to protect the Nation’s rights and interests, my fieldwork led me to explore energy 
governance as a lived experience. Ultimately, my fieldwork enabled me to engage with the 
professional network that manages energy extraction in northern Alberta. 
1.1 Research Purpose 
As Joly and Westman (2017) note, authoritative research on the cultural and social impacts of oil 
sands extraction in northern Alberta is still lacking, especially relative to other industrial 
endeavours of the same magnitude. The purpose of my research is to explore energy governance 
in northern Alberta, with a particular focus on the political processes and practitioner 
communities that negotiate oil and gas extraction. To this end, I have engaged in institutional 
ethnography. A number of critical questions merit investigation: In light of changing social and 
political conditions in the Canadian context, how has energy governance in northern Alberta 
evolved? And how have energy governance actors, such as Indigenous communities’ 
consultation teams, strategically mobilized in these political processes over the last 20 years, as 
the duty to consult and accommodate has evolved through case law? This thesis builds on the 
findings of over four months of ethnographic fieldwork with the Mikisew Cree First Nation in 
northern Alberta. Since the late 1990s, the Mikisew Cree have been thoroughly involved in 
negotiating energy extraction in the oil sands region, and have harnessed greater self-
determination through political engagement (Slowey 2008). I argue that while attempts are being 
made to enhance the participatory capacity of energy governance in northern Alberta, oil sands 
extraction is managed by a relatively closed network of experts, resulting in the discounting of 
Indigenous voices and rights. In order to combat the traditionally closed practice of energy 
governance in Alberta, Indigenous mobilization has become increasingly sophisticated, rising in 
capacity and complexity. 
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1.2 The Community Context 
Cree peoples have occupied northwestern Canada, as far west as the Peace River, since long 
before European contact (J. G. E. Smith 1987). In the late 18th century, trading posts in the 
region prompted the formation of Fort Chipewyan (est. 1788), a plural society (McCormack 
2010), occupied primarily by Cree, Chipewyan, and Métis people. The hamlet of Fort 
Chipewyan was originally founded as a trading post and fur trade “factory” (McCormack 2010: 
17). Today, Mikisew membership and administration is based in Fort Chipewyan (colloquially 
referred to as Fort Chip), Alberta. Mikisew members also reside in substantial numbers in Fort 
McMurray, Edmonton, and Fort Smith (Northwest Territories).  
Prior to European contact, Indigenous land use in northern Alberta was seasonally mobile 
(McCormack 2010: 20); the land was not owned by specific groups of Indigenous people. 
McCormack (2010: 3) notes that prior to the signing of Treaty 8 (1899), there was no entity 
known as the Mikisew Cree First Nation, and no conceptualization of a uniquely Cree territory. 
Today, Mikisew asserts that its traditional lands cover much of the oil sands deposits, and centre 
upon the Peace-Athabasca Delta (PAD) and its tributaries (Appendix A) (MCFN 2014; 2016). 
McCormack (2010) characterizes the PAD as “an area of possibly unparalleled resource 
extraction” (18) for Indigenous land users. For centuries, the region has provided Indigenous 
land users with a wide range of subarctic furbearers, waterfowl, small game, fish, carnivores, as 
well as ungulates, including bison, caribou, and moose (J. G. E. Smith 1981: 262; McCormack 
2010: 18-19). Many Mikisew members continue to spend longer spans of time in “the bush,” 
engaging in cultural subsistence practices in the subarctic environments surrounding Fort 
Chipewyan.  
Mikisew refers to the land as kitaskino, a Cree term that the Nation employs to signify 
“the land that we belong to and are related to” (Mikisew Cree First Nation 2016: 16). The need 
to maintain Mikisew’s traditional practices and reciprocal relations with the land is apparent in 
historical accords. Following the signing of Treaty 8 (1899), commissioners Laird, Ross, and 
McKenna wrote, “We assured them that the treaty would not lead to any forced interference with 
their mode of life.” As signatories to Treaty 8 in 1899, the Cree Band sought guaranteed 
protection for its traditional way of life (McCormack 2010). The lands that Treaty 8 set out for 
First Nations use and occupation were not fully allocated by the Government of Canada 
following its negotiation (Fumoleau 1975 [2004]: 412-415). As a result, the Mikisew Cree and 
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Canada signed the Treaty Land Entitlement (TLE) in 1986. The TLE (1986) also set forth 
Canada’s commitment to “make every reasonable effort to correct man-induced changes to the 
natural water-level regime of the Peace-Athabasca Delta basin” (6). Despite extractive industrial 
presence, living on the land continues to be a central component of Mikisew members’ lives, 
much as Southcott and Natcher (2017) suggest holds across the Canadian North. Many members 
shared with me their aspirations to permanently occupy their cabins in the bush upon retiring 
from wage-based employment, though the degree to which they actualize these wishes is 
uncertain. 
The Mikisew Cree are not entirely opposed to energy extraction; recognizing the 
economic benefits (and perhaps the inevitability) of industrial activity in the region, instead, they 
demand the right to participate in related decision-making. In 1992, during the Royal 
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP), Chief Waquan declared, “The people of the 
Mikisew Cree First Nation will never relinquish [the] claim to self-determination, to self-
government, to our inherent rights” (RCAP 1992: 67). The Mikisew Cree, like many First 
Nations, are not simply stewards of the land; threats to the natural environment they occupy also 
constitute threats to their own survival (Slowey and Stefanick 2015; Wanvik and Caine 2017). 
As a result, Mikisew insists on being a part of relevant negotiations and land use planning 
schemes, and has spearheaded collaborative governance arrangements in hopes of ensuring the 
protection of the First Nation’s rights and interests. In essence, the Mikisew Cree are attempting 
to integrate local perspectives, as well as place-based values, within neoliberal economic and 
political systems (Slowey 2008).  
Mikisew’s primary representative body within energy governance contexts is their 
Government and Industry Relations office, where I based my fieldwork. Otherwise referred to as 
industry relations corporations (IRCs) or sustainability departments, many First Nations and 
Métis communities in the Lower Athabasca region are represented by such establishments, 
which facilitate their participation in regional economic activity (Zalik 2016). Fort McMurray is 
a nexus of energy governance; it constitutes the major junction for government, industry, and 
community representation in the region. This made it the opportune locale for my ethnographic 
work. Governing energy extraction in northern Alberta is a complex endeavour with cultural, 
economic, and political dynamics. My research has necessitated cross-disciplinary sensitivity, 
despite being grounded in Anthropology. Environmental Anthropology suits my research, as it 
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draws on interdisciplinary connections, encouraging the cross-pollination of ideas with 
sociologists, political scientists, economists, archaeologists, and heritage studies. 
Negotiating land use and extraction on behalf of Mikisew, the GIR reports to the First 
Nation’s Chief and Council. Since being founded in 2001, the Mikisew Cree First Nation’s 
Government and Industry Relations Office has liaised between industry, governmental bodies, 
and MCFN. The GIR office consists of a team of between 10 and 15 workers, with numbers 
fluctuating due to summer hiring, workers’ mobility, and the office’s changing needs. The 
majority of staff possesses post-secondary certifications or degrees, specializing in resource 
management, environmental sciences, or administration. Of the 12 GIR staff members that I met 
during my fieldwork, 6 were Mikisew members, 2 were from other Cree or Dene communities, 
and 4 were of Euro-Canadian descent. Office staff oversee and facilitate regulatory and 
consultation processes, capacity building for participation in energy governance, and long-term 
partnerships between the Mikisew membership, industry, and government. The public 
participation processes navigated by GIR staff are informed by obligations towards holders of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights that are entrenched in the Constitution, and have been developed 
through case law.  
1.3 The Legal Context: Informing Consultation in the Oil Sands Region 
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 reserved for the Crown the exclusive right to negotiate for land 
title with Indigenous inhabitants. The Proclamation became the foundation of Indian treaty 
making in Canada (Dion 2008: 3). There were 68 major historical treaties in Canada (Morris 
1991), covering large parts of the country. In these treaties, the rights to “take up” the land were 
generally set out for the Crown (Asch 2014), which constitutes both federal and provincial 
governments. The Constitution Act of 1867 affirmed the federal government’s exclusive 
authority over Indians and lands reserved for Indians (s. 91(24)). Canada’s repatriation of the 
Constitution in 1982 protects existing Aboriginal and treaty rights (s. 35), minimizing the ability 
of government decision-making to impede such rights. Subsequent legal decisions have 
reinforced Indigenous claims to rights. 
Over the last few decades, the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate Indigenous 
peoples has progressively evolved through case law. This is particularly relevant to industrial 
extraction contexts. The courts describe the relationship between First Nations and government 
as unique, or sui generis. The Supreme Court of Canada first affirmed the Crown’s fiduciary 
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obligations toward Indigenous peoples in Guerin v. The Queen (1984), characterizing these 
obligations as “trust-like in character.” Thus, the Crown possesses the burden of justifying any 
infringement of Aboriginal rights (Dion 2008: 14), and by consequence of this fiduciary 
relationship, exercising some restraint in asserting its sovereign power (R. v. Sparrow 1990). R. 
v. Van Der Peet (1996) confirmed the legal fiduciary relationship between the Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples, asserting that statutory and constitutional provisions protecting Aboriginal 
interests be given a generous interpretation (Dion 2008: 16). The court held that the honour of 
the Crown is at stake in all dealings with Aboriginal peoples (R. v. Van Der Peet 1996). Chief 
Justice Lamer also emphasized that s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act operates as a means of 
reconciling the pre-existence of Indigenous societies with the sovereignty of the Crown (R. v. 
Van Der Peet 1996). In Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1997), Lamer emphasized that the 
Crown has the right and obligation in the public interest to undertake a broad spectrum of 
development on Aboriginal lands, subject to consultation. Haida Nation v. British Columbia 
(Minister of Forests) (2004) held that where the Crown has knowledge that its conduct may 
infringe upon an Aboriginal right, Section 35 obliges that the duty to consult, and accommodate, 
if appropriate, is triggered (Dion 2008: 17; NCFNG 2007: 30). The nature of the exercise of that 
duty is to be proportionate to the circumstances, which comprise the strength of the right 
claimed, and the severity of the potential infringement. In Haida (2004), the Court also found 
that the duty to consult extends to the Crown in right of provincial governments, while 
emphasizing that the duties of consultation and accommodation do not entail a duty to agree with 
Aboriginal people (NCFNG 2007). In Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia 
(2004), the Supreme Court held that accommodation required “only a reasonable balance 
between the Aboriginal concerns and competing considerations” (NCFNG 2007: 33). Mikisew 
Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage) (2005) expanded the Crown’s duty 
to consult to First Nations with historical treaty rights. This has implications for bitumen 
extraction in Alberta, as many projects span Treaty 8 territory. Recent Canadian jurisprudence 
holds that government decisions affecting Aboriginal and treaty rights cannot be taken without 
prior consultation, thus transforming energy governance processes.  
Reconciliation is the lens used to interpret and frame the duty to consult, according to the 
Supreme Court (Chippewas 2017; Clyde River 2017). Reconciliation is a primary goal 
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underlying the practice of consultation (Haida 20042; Taku River 20043). This broad societal aim 
requires the negotiation of tangible transfers of power, and the realization of a nation-to-nation 
relationship between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian government (Government of Canada 
2017; Nickerson 2017). Attempts to reconcile the prior occupation of Indigenous peoples in 
North America with Canada’s political and legal structure have been undertaken in various forms 
throughout our history. Treaty-making was one such endeavour (Mikisew Cree 2005). As 
anthropologist Asch (2014) posits, the recognition of Canadian leaders of their failure to adhere 
to the promises of treaties, and the reverberations of that failure among Indigenous peoples, 
guides the contemporary push for reconciliation. At the concept’s core is the idea that prior 
Indigenous occupation must be reconciled with the assertion of Canadian sovereignty 
(Delgamuukw 1997: para. 186) – or, as Asch (2002; 2014), McNeil (1999), and Tully (2008) 
argue, that Canadian sovereignty must be reconciled with prior and ongoing Indigenous 
sovereignty. As Woolford (2005) highlights, reconciliation is a process of ongoing engagement, 
rather than a full, final settlement.  
Today, reconciliation is a driver of political reform (Government of Canada 2017; Schaap 
2008). Representatives of Mikisew employed reconciliation as a major touchstone in political 
discussions. As focus group participants noted, reconciliation sparked conversations with 
government, although the actual outcomes of such broad socio-political discourse were less 
certain. Mikisew’s vision of reconciliation prioritizes the access to, and decision-making power 
over, their traditional lands. In conversation in November 2017, following an engagement 
session with Parks Canada on the Strategic Environmental Assessment for Wood Buffalo, the 
Director of the GIR stated that from Mikisew’s perspective, reconciliation with Canada is 
contingent on the health of the Peace-Athabasca Delta (pers. comm. 22 November 2017). This 
investigation of energy governance and Indigenous mobilization in the oil sands aligns with 
Tully’s (2004) notion of agonistic reconciliation, which highlights that dialogical and 
participatory political engagement enables the pursuit of peaceful coexistence between 
Indigenous communities and the Crown.                                                         
2 “The accommodation that may result from pre-proof consultation is just this — seeking compromise in 
an attempt to harmonize conflicting interests and move further down the path of reconciliation” (Haida, 
2004, at para. 49). 
3 “The Crown’s honour cannot be interpreted narrowly or technically, but must be given full effect in 
order to promote the process of reconciliation mandated by s. 35(1)” (Supra, at para. 24). 
 8 
1.4 Thesis Overview 
This thesis follows a traditional monograph format. Chapter Two explores the research process 
underlying this ethnographic fieldwork. In order to evaluate the changing social and political 
processes governing energy extraction in northern Alberta, the critical imperative of institutional 
ethnography is described. Chapter Three examines the changing landscape of energy governance 
in northern Alberta. In particular, Chapter Three assesses Alberta’s reputation of regulatory 
capture, as well as the revolving door that cycles experts between regulators and other major 
players in energy governance, and the idea of public interest. Relatedly, I document the 
emergence of a network of workers specialized in consultation and regulatory processes in 
northern Alberta. Finally, I undertake a review of regulatory reforms in recent years, highlighting 
informants’ perspectives on related engagement initiatives. Chapter Four investigates the 
changing mobilization patterns espoused by Indigenous communities in the oil sands region, 
primarily attending to the GIR’s strategies and the degree to which they may enhance the pursuit 
of Mikisew’s interests. Chapter Five explores Mikisew’s recent immersion in international 
advocacy work at UNESCO’s World Heritage Committee, where the First Nation lobbied for 
greater protection of Wood Buffalo National Park. Through my ethnographic investigation, I 
document the impetus for Mikisew’s 2014 petition, the experience of advocating at UNESCO 
during the 2017 World Heritage Committee meeting in Poland, and the potential outcomes of 
this advocacy work. Chapter Six concludes by reflecting upon the work that precedes it. In 
particular, it assesses the implications of the ongoing evolution of energy governance and 
Indigenous mobilization in northern Alberta, while relating them to broader rights- and 
reconciliation-focused movements in Canada at large. Future research directions are also offered.   
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Chapter Two: The Research Process 
2.1 Study Design 
In qualitatively oriented methodologies such as Ethnography, the research process itself should 
be considered a critical component in reporting and analyzing findings, as who we are inevitably 
alters our experiences in the field. As Nader (1996) states, “science is not value free” (18). All 
scientists’ work is affected by historical, cultural, political, and other structural factors. Authority 
can be derived from ethnographic work by illuminating the empirical import of one’s 
conclusions with clarity, Carrithers et al. (1990) reinforce. This chapter explores the origins and 
process of my research. After setting out my positionality and axiology, I will outline the 
rationale and core tenets of the methodology I have employed, touching upon the 
epistemological and ontological considerations necessitated by my subject matter. Then, I will 
present the process by which I entered the field, before setting forth the methods of data 
collection that I employed. I conclude by considering the bounds of my field site. This review of 
my research design lays the groundwork for the chapters that follow, which present and engage 
with my experiences and findings in the field. 
 Since high school, I have been deeply intrigued by the ways in which policymaking 
addresses environmental issues, as well as the interchange between individuals and broader 
policies. I was drawn to the study of energy governance in Canada because of the balance of 
convenience argument that is often used to validate industrial activity. For instance in northern 
Quebec, where I coordinated a brief research trip in 2013, authorities excuse the social 
consequences of hydroelectric damming impacting Cree peoples – such as forced displacement – 
as unfortunate but necessary side effects of energy extraction. Extraction in the oil sands is 
justified along a similar vein, with proponents arguing that the benefits it accrues for Canadian 
society at large – chiefly energy security and economic growth – far outweigh its impacts.  
Studying oil sands governance merits immersive research that is best facilitated through 
ethnography, which constitutes an open-ended, emergent learning process (Whitehead 2005: 4). 
“Making the strange familiar and the familiar strange” (Spiro 1992: 53) is the chief challenge of 
ethnography. Ethnographers aim to comprehend and render familiar seemingly impenetrable 
social contexts, which can be found in anything from a far-flung Indigenous tribe to a powerful 
institution. The research methodology of ethnography is a reflexive social constructivist practice 
(Whitehead 2005: 4); it provides anthropologists with the opportunity to attend to individuals’ 
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perspectives and worldviews on complex social problems and lived realities. As Tsing (2015) 
states, “The point of ethnography is to learn how to think about a situation together with one’s 
informants; research categories develop with the research, not before it” (ix). The inductive 
nature of ethnography means that even research goals may emerge through collaboration (Tsing 
2015: ix). My inductive-iterative research process has been a product of cooperation with 
participants. 
As Rogers (2015: 365) notes, anthropologists have long attended to the relationships 
between key stakeholders and Indigenous communities in negotiating extraction. Employing the 
holistic methodology of ethnography enables me to examine the ways in which these actors 
navigate energy governance regimes. Immersive qualitative fieldwork illuminates the competing 
interests and priorities at play in managing industrial expansion (Rogers 2015), many of which 
are apparent among MCFN. Multivocality is thoroughly prioritized in ethnographic work; this 
feature allows researchers to achieve emic validity (Whitehead 2005: 4). While I did not have 
sufficient access to Mikisew membership at large to feel I realized emic validity within MCFN 
as a whole, I gained access to this multivocality within the GIR, among their staff, and the 
interlocutors with whom they frequently engage and ally. The openness of ethnography towards 
divergent knowledge frameworks has equipped me to study the processes of meaning-making 
and social construction inherent in negotiating energy extraction (Rogers 2015). In regard to 
complex social issues, knowledge is deeply contextual, intersubjective, and ever changing. 
Ethnography encourages epistemological relativism and flexibility (Whitehead 2005). This 
allows anthropologists to render porous seemingly self-enclosed epistemic communities (Haas 
1992) such as governmental agencies. As will be discussed further in Chapter Three, Haas 
(1992) defines epistemic communities as “network[s] of professionals with recognized expertise 
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within that domain or issue-area” (3). Studying the specialized realm of energy governance in a 
cross-cultural context such as northern Alberta renders ethnography invaluable. Accounting for 
perspectives on, and experiences of, energy governance in the oil sands region necessitates 
epistemological relativism and ontological subjectivism. 
Institutional ethnography is a methodological tool that connects the global and the local, 
and ties structure with agency and subjectivity (Shore and Wright 2006). Due to my avid interest 
in the links that connect development, policymaking, and communities, I chose to employ the 
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methodology of institutional ethnography. Institutional ethnography can be defined as “a method 
of inquiry that problematizes social relations at the level of lived experience and examines how 
textual sequences coordinate consciousness and ruling relations” (Walby 2007: 158). 
Institutional ethnography is fitting for this research topic, as it deconstructs the opacity of ruling 
relations (McCauley 2014). Complex energy governance regimes are inherently places in which 
knowledge is created and futures are negotiated (Westman 2013). Moreover, as McCauley 
(2014) notes, extra-local ruling relations and institutions impact lives and regulate everyday 
processes, which are system-sensitive.  
In recent decades, the ethnographic field has expanded, as recognition has grown that 
people would only be fully understood in relation to institutions and globalized nexuses of power 
(Niezen and Sapignoli 2017: 4). Even the most remote areas are embedded in the world system 
(Ervin 2015). Laura Nader (1972; 1997) famously called for anthropologists to “study up” social 
power structures in the 1970s. Other ethnographers have expanded upon this pivotal call. 
Reinhold (1994; 2011), for instance, argues that researchers must “study through” the sites and 
situations of policymaking (Shore and Wright 2006). Institutions have been cemented as 
legitimate subjects of inquiry in anthropology in the last decades (Abélès 2017), as 
ethnographers recognize the need to attend to larger processes of societal change (Rogers 2015). 
My ethnographic research takes up this rising call. I have striven to expand Anthropology’s 
points of engagement in order to better grasp the manners in which Indigenous peoples in 
resource conflict areas such as northern Alberta are defending their life projects (Blaser 2004), 
and reinforcing their rights through navigating seemingly impenetrable – if rhetorically inclusive 
– neoliberal governance regimes (Slowey 2008).  
Through institutional ethnography, I have situated my exploratory research within diverse 
decision-making contexts, in order to analyze loci of power. Relationships between the local and 
the global are deep-rooted (Roseberry 1988). This calls for a globalized research perspective that 
accumulates knowledge in diffuse time and space (Marcus 1995: 98). As Marcus (1995) stresses, 
multi-sited ethnography has become the norm in much of contemporary Anthropology. A multi-
sited institutional ethnography allows distinctive discourses to be cross-examined in order to 
assess how they contribute to social constructions and knowledge (e.g., Carr 2009). Institutions 
of governance are social worlds with distinct characters (Niezen and Sapignoli 2017: 3). 
Institutional ethnography (IE) explores systems of power by analyzing the situated subjects that 
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find themselves within it. As McCauley (2014) states, “IE, then, requires mapping the ruling 
relations in such a way that exposes the coordinating mechanisms between institutional discourse 
and the actualities of the work in which people are engaged” (24). Politics and expertise are 
social phenomena that merit ethnographic attention, and the cultures of modern bureaucracies 
necessitate thorough study (Carr 2010; Shore 2005). Given their wide-reaching impacts, focusing 
on the internal dynamics and culture of organizations is critical (Herzfeld 1992). Employing an 
ethnographic gaze in a field dominated by deep-seated power relations, norms, and political 
structures has enabled me to grasp some of the changing dynamics of energy governance in one 
of the most hotly contested industrial sites in the world.  
2.2 Entering the Field 
In May 2016, prior to starting my Master’s coursework, my professor, Dr. Clint Westman, 
invited me to attend a partnership meeting in Athabasca, AB. The meeting informed his ongoing 
collaborative research project, Cultural Politics of Energy. Indigenous representatives from 
northern Alberta joined with non-profit organizations and university researchers from across the 
country to discuss issues related to industrial development, research needs, and information gaps 
that could perhaps be served by this research partnership. I also met with other students working 
with Dr. Westman, such as Jennifer Gerbrandt (2015), who had completed her fieldwork in 2013 
through Westman’s grants and ethics proposal. Gerbrandt began working for MCFN in early 
2018, although her research focused on the Woodland Cree First Nation (WCFN). After 
presenting my own research experience and possible interests just prior to the end of the two-day 
gathering, several First Nations members and NGO representatives approached me with ideas. 
Among them was a representative from Mikisew Cree First Nation’s GIR office, who mentioned 
that First Nations in the region would benefit from research on consultation and free prior and 
informed consent (FPIC), and what related ideas might mean in practice. Since writing a term 
paper on the oil sands as an undergraduate at McGill University, I had been quite curious about 
Mikisew’s mobilization efforts. Come September, upon relocating to Saskatoon, conversations 
began with my supervisor on possible partnerships for my forthcoming fieldwork. I looked to 
engage with Dr. Westman’s Cultural Politics of Energy research program by complementing 
other MA students’ inquiries on consultation in other First Nations (i.e., Woodland Cree First 
Nation and Peerless Trout First Nation), directing my focus towards governance contexts and 
institutional relationships. 
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I am deeply aware of the extractive nature of much research in Indigenous communities 
(Ball and Janyst 2008; Kovach 2005; Santos 2008). This reality made me wary, initially, to 
express my interest in working with Mikisew, especially given that MCFN has experienced 
research fatigue with the rise of industrial activity. I was concerned about the response to hosting 
yet another academic from afar. I was determined to ensure my presence was not invasive. My 
supervisor, who had already established a research relationship with Mikisew, was happy to see 
if the enthusiasm that Mikisew’s representative had expressed the previous spring still held. Dr. 
Westman reconnected with the Director at the GIR, Melody Lepine, and after correspondence 
over the fall term, we set up a preliminary meeting in person in Fort McMurray for January 
2017. 
Throughout my fieldwork (May-September 2017), I used the act of writing fieldnotes to 
reflect upon my place in the GIR and in Fort McMurray, as well as the ways in which I could 
ensure respectful engagement, and maintain awareness of my positionality as a young Euro-
Canadian woman. When conducting research with Indigenous peoples, anthropologists must 
address questions of representation, power, and authority (Asch 2001). Issues surrounding 
representation are a key concern for the practice of ethnography (e.g., Clifford and Marcus 
1986). Working with and on behalf of a First Nation necessitated that I confront my privilege 
and possible biases as a settler Canadian, and maintain awareness of how to best engage with 
contacts of divergent life experiences. I nurtured trusting, positive connections long before 
starting any formal interviews. Maintaining these reciprocal ties has been a priority since my 
return from the field as well. Sustaining open lines of communication with primary interlocutors 
has allowed me to address any concerns that have arisen as I have endeavoured to represent my 
fieldwork and informants. 
Unsteady conditions of entry and engagement constitute the primary drawback to the 
practice of institutional ethnography (Niezen and Sapignoli 2017: 8). It is difficult to gain and 
maintain access to institutional settings and “elite” informants (Dexter 2012; Welch et al. 2002). 
Oftentimes, one must approach the gatekeeper of a given institution or organization to obtain 
permission to conduct fieldwork within the entity. My supervisor’s prior research connection to 
Mikisew and the GIR’s Director helped ease access to the site, and connecting in person allowed 
me to secure the requisite institutional approval for my work. I saw Fort McMurray for the first 
time under a deep frost, in -35°C weather. My supervisor and I flew up for a quick overnight 
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stay, just long enough to fit in dinner with a past student of his (and soon-to-be friend of mine) 
working in Fort McMurray, a meeting at the GIR, and a tour of town and the surrounding area. 
While I knew of McMurray’s rougher reputation and was aware the city was in a state of rebuild 
post-wildfire (May 2016), the city’s centrality to industrial activity and access to oil sands 
governance suited my research interests. The meeting with Melody Lepine was favourable; she 
agreed to host me in the office over the summer months so that I could complete my fieldwork 
with Mikisew. In exchange, I promised to assist the office as much as I could while advancing 
my own research. Dr. Westman and I learned that I would be supported by the GIR’s staff travel 
budget – I assumed this would allow me to attend meetings in town and perhaps make it to Fort 
Chip on a few occasions. I could not have foreseen the whirlwind summer that awaited me at the 
GIR. 
Once in the field, my methodology evolved from being not just an anthropological 
investigation, but also an inescapably political endeavour. After wrapping up coursework, 
obtaining the required approvals from the University of Saskatchewan’s ethics board,4 and 
packing up, I ventured north. Upon arriving in Fort McMurray in late April, I learned that I 
would be working with Mikisew’s Government Relations Manager. Normally two legal interns 
held summer placements, but this year the manager was without the extra hands. I was asked to 
fill the void left by their absence as much as I could, and the GIR staff began referring to me as 
the research intern. As mentioned earlier, one of the major concerns I had about my fieldwork 
was the possibility of engaging in extractive research. I have always been adamant that public 
concerns and interests should guide my studies. Establishing some sort of research relationship 
based on reciprocity is a common priority for anthropologists and social scientists at large. The 
centrality of reciprocity in northern Canadian contexts is widely acknowledged in 
anthropological work (Anderson 2014; Scott 1996). More attention is also being paid to the need 
for social researchers to strive for reciprocal relationships with host communities (Baker 2016). 
To my relief, I realized that this labour exchange in government relations could help address my 
fears about engaging in non-reciprocal research. My ties to the GIR may have enabled my access 
to some stakeholders, and hindered my access to others.  
                                                        
4 My research is covered under Dr. Westman’s existing ethics approval (Permit BEH#13-10). In 2017, the 
ethics board added MCFN as a field site, and myself as a researcher, after Mikisew provided written 
support for the project. My consent form is attached as Appendix B. 
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My placement at the GIR helped me foster a mutually beneficial relationship with 
Mikisew. I was able to meaningfully contribute to the office’s work by proof-reading Mikisew’s 
position papers and submissions on government files; by summarizing emergent policies for the 
office; by note-taking; and by providing them with literature of relevance to their files as 
requested, such as on sense of place, that would be of utility at negotiation tables. In return, 
Mikisew’s representatives put up with my presence and interrogations about that which would 
otherwise be taken for granted in their circles; introduced me to seasoned players in energy 
governance in the region; and brought me along to federal and provincial consultation and 
engagement sessions as their budgeting permitted. The GIR facilitated my access to over 40 
meetings, myriad informal gatherings and social activities, and other contexts that proved 
incredibly intellectually stimulating (detailed further in the pages that follow). I was constantly 
exhilarated by the opportunities that the GIR offered me. I feel very fortunate to have been 
embraced by Mikisew’s team with open arms, despite being a young researcher from Montreal. I 
feel even luckier to have been offered the chance to meaningfully contribute to their work as 
both a social scientist and a young professional with experience in non-governmental organizing. 
At the request of their senior management, I have since remained engaged remotely as an 
independent consultant, supporting them for 2-3 hours a week on average, primarily through 
document analysis, as the need has arisen. For instance, I reviewed a draft Strategic 
Environmental Assessment for Wood Buffalo National Park, and my notes and summative 
analysis helped GIR staff prepare for subsequent engagement sessions. My interpretations may 
have been influenced by my positionality as an engaged researcher and as an independent 
consultant. 
The advantages of ethnographic research lie in its open-endedness. Ethnographers are 
equipped and encouraged to respond to local circumstances and events. My immersion in the 
institutional environment of oil sands governance, and my contact with MCFN, prompted new 
lines of investigation and added to the iterative, inductive nature of my research. The long hours 
spent at the GIR office and alongside Mikisew’s members and employees added to the depth and 
relevance of my work.  
2.3 Data Collection  
Institutional ethnography offers a practice-based understanding of environmental governance 
regimes. Fundamentally, the organizational structure is the primary obstacle to conducting 
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institutional ethnography. Bureaucratic management masks the foundations and machinery of 
institutions as regulatory bodies and authorities (Niezen and Sapignoli 2017; Shore and Wright 
2006). Each institution therefore demands a unique approach and set of methods. Capitalizing 
upon multiple sources of data heightens the trustworthiness of this iterative methodology 
(Strathern 2000). My study design was tailored to the specificities of my research context. The 
data collection methods I undertook throughout my fieldwork were participant observation, in-
depth interviews, a focus group, and document and policy analysis. My methods and their 
application are described in the sections that follow.  
2.3.1 Participant observation 
Participant observation is the central method in Anthropology, as well as the primary 
source of ethnography’s rich insights (Belshaw 1976). According to Malinowski (1922), the 
founder of modern anthropological fieldwork, the ethnographer’s ultimate goal is to grasp the 
local’s point of view and their relation to life, and to realize their vision of their world (25). 
Participant observation aims to comprehend the social fabric, and consists of directly observing 
and participating in everyday life in the field in order to grasp agency, discourse, and practices. 
Striving to study the seemingly mundane and everyday, or “the imponderabilia of everyday life” 
(Malinowski 1922: 22), necessitates that researchers fully immerse themselves in their host 
communities. Recording observed data of real behaviour complements the analysis of documents 
and informants’ statements (Malinowski 1922: 17).  
Governance is not traditionally studied through participant observation (but see Coulter 
and Schumann 2012; Schia 2013). Yet as Merry (2002) argues, ethnography is necessary to 
situate governance mechanisms and policies, drawing from many actors’ viewpoints and 
accounting for the everyday behaviour underlying political shifts (137). Building rapport and 
connecting with informants over time is critical to grasping their circumstances and perspectives; 
I have found this is especially the case regarding contentious issues such as fossil fuel extraction. 
As Schia (2013) highlights, the importance of studying informal working cultures when 
deconstructing institutional practices cannot be understated.  
In the field, a typical weekday saw me walk to work at the GIR office and arrive by 8:30 
a.m. For the first half hour, I would usually sit in the lobby, greeting staff and learning about the 
meetings and priorities of the day, as I checked my emails and reviewed documents sent my way 
by GIR managers. The bulk of the workday was spent in meetings, on conference calls, or 
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analyzing and editing working documents for GIR staff. I spent my lunch break out walking, or 
with some of the three Mikisew members employed as summer students. After work ended for 
the day (usually by 4:30 or 5 p.m.), I might attend a beading circle or Cree language class at the 
McMurray Métis office or the Nistawoyou Friendship Centre, or head out to run or attend a yoga 
class. I would return back to my summer rental and chat with my housemates about their shifts 
on site (the majority of those with whom I shared lodging throughout the summer worked in the 
oil sands industry), before retiring to my room to write fieldnotes documenting and reflecting 
upon the day’s events and conversations. Ethnographic knowledge is amassed by engaging with 
informants and research material outside of discrete, condensed periods of data collection (such 
as interviews or surveys). I gleaned a far better understanding of the lived experiences and 
perspectives of my interlocutors by observing and participating in everyday life in Fort 
McMurray. 
On the days I spent traveling with GIR representatives, I would wake early for 
preparatory meetings over breakfast (normally starting at 7:30 a.m.). By 8:30 a.m., we would 
migrate to the office or hotel conference room in which the day’s meetings were being held. I 
took notes during the meetings in their entirety, usually near verbatim, for my own records as 
well as at the request of the GIR’s legal team. Over lunchtime, I would retreat with Mikisew’s 
staff to a nearby restaurant to “caucus,” or debrief regarding the morning’s discussions, and 
prepare for the upcoming points on the agenda. By 4 or 5 p.m., the meeting would wrap up, at 
which point we would flag down a taxi to fly back to Ft. McMurray, or debrief over dinner. If the 
meetings were held on back-to-back days, I would expect to talk with GIR staff until 10 or 11 
p.m. before turning in ahead of another full day. A similar schedule applied while in Poland for 
the UNESCO meetings. My fieldwork extended far beyond formal spaces such as meeting rooms 
and offices. The time I spent engaging with informants in these liminal spaces and transitional 
periods provided tremendous insights on the act of negotiating energy extraction. 
I did not get the opportunity to spend significant amounts of time on the land with 
Mikisew members. I made it to Fort Chipewyan on three occasions. I attended and volunteered at 
Treaty Days for MCFN, ACFN, and the Fort Chipewyan Métis Local 125 in June; the Athabasca 
Tribal Council’s gathering for residential school survivors in August; and the GIR’s Annual 
Elder’s Retreat in August. These occasions allowed me to spend four to seven days at a time in 
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Fort Chipewyan, lodging with the extended families of GIR staff that had generously arranged 
this accommodation.  
2.3.2 Open-ended interviews 
Like participant observation, open-ended interviews offer profound insight into the lived 
realities and perspectives of informants. As Weller (2014) asserts, interviews are powerful tools 
for assessing knowledge and attitudes, exploring the classification of categories, and describing 
respondents’ beliefs. I conducted semi-structured interviewing, as it elicits knowledge from a 
nuanced perspective (Van der Waal 2009). As Niezen’s (2013) work on Canada’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) demonstrates, open-ended interviews offer the chance for 
dialogue with individuals who hold unpopular stances or are silenced by political entities. 
Interviews enable ethnographers to explore the discursive conflicts at play in powerful 
institutions that possess societal authority. This method also facilitates interpersonal rapport, 
deepening ethnographers’ understanding of the observations they make in the field.  
I engaged in open-ended interviews in hopes of capturing a range of views from those who 
actively engage in environmental governance processes or are impacted by these systems. My 
respondents included MCFN members (two); external consultants (three) and staff (three) hired 
by several First Nations in Fort McMurray and Fort McKay; government and industry 
representatives (three and one, respectively); and an analyst at the Pembina Institute (one), a non-
profit, Alberta-founded organization that provides research and education on extraction. The 
interviewees diverged in the degree to which they had been immersed in oil sands governance. 
On the one hand, one Regulatory Coordinator that I interviewed had worked for various First 
Nations and multi-stakeholder groups over the last 16 years, after initially starting her career in 
reclamation with Golder Associates, and a lawyer that I interviewed had worked with Mikisew 
and eight other Alberta First Nations over the last decade. Yet on the other hand, I also 
interviewed a Crown Consultation Coordinator who had only been immersed in the oil sands 
context in the past two years, and a Mikisew member who had contributed to various projects 
documenting the impacts of oil sands extraction, but had only recently begun engaging with the 
GIR. My youngest informant was in their early 20s, and the oldest in their 70s. Ten identified as 
women, and three as men. Four were Indigenous, and nine were not. Several of these informants 
requested full anonymity; others are referred to throughout the thesis by their professional title 
and/or their name.  
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Potential interviewees were mostly identified using the “snowball” technique (Goodman 
1961). I took a somewhat passive approach to soliciting interviewees. My avoidance of nagging 
or forcefully pursuing participation was especially important to me in recognition of the research 
fatigue identified within the oil sands region. Between June and August 2017, I conducted 13 
interviews based upon a loosely structured interview guide assembled prior to my fieldwork 
(Appendix C), while also pursuing leads and points of interest as they arose in conversation, at 
my discretion (see Bernard 2006). While this did lead to variability in the exact implementation 
of my interview guide, which formed the basis for all recorded interviews, I covered a consistent 
set of themes throughout these discussions, which occurred in locales selected by my 
interviewees. I conducted 11 interviews in person, within GIR offices; cafés in Ft. McMurray; a 
Polish coach bus; and ceremonial grounds in Ft. Chipewyan and Ft. Smith. I conducted two 
interviews over Skype, with informants based in Calgary, after our attempts to connect while at 
meetings together in person were unsuccessful. My interview practice has constituted an iterative 
process. I returned transcripts to informants prior to completing my analysis in order to offer 
them the chance to expand, clarify, or correct anything they may have shared in person.  
2.3.3 Focus group 
Focus groups are widely used to determine individuals’ decision-making processes and 
the sources of their opinions (Bernard 2006: 233; Merton 1987). While I had initially hoped to 
conduct two focus groups in the field, only one came to fruition, in August 2017. The focus 
group was held with half a dozen staff at the Mikisew office, with all of whom I interacted on a 
daily basis (but had not previously interviewed). These participants were selected given their 
central roles in the GIR team. All participants had worked at the GIR or in similar roles 
contributing to oil sands-focused consultation and regulatory processes for at least five years, and 
up to 15 years. Four identified as women, and two as men. The majority of the participants were 
Indigenous (three Cree, one Dene), and two were not. The purpose of this focus group was to 
discern their perspectives on how energy governance has evolved in recent years, and the extent 
to which governance processes are considered meaningful and capable of enhancing Mikisew’s 
rights and priorities.  
The focus group model allowed me to compare and contrast individual experiences and 
perspectives on these matters, as I asked respondents to elaborate further when inconsistencies 
arose within the group’s responses. This was the case, for instance, in the simplified pile sorting 
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activity that I conducted regarding different strategies that the GIR and similar offices in Fort 
McMurray and Fort McKay pursue to defend band members’ interests (see Chapter Four). After 
I remarked that only two respondents’ sorted piles had matched, the group teased apart their 
reasoning for responding differently. The GIR Operations Manager shared, “It all kind of plays 
into each other […] Negotiation with industry can lend into lobbying and advocacy. Industry can 
help you lobby and advocate to the government, I mean, because obviously industry has a lot of 
clout” (FG-04, 21 August 2017). In response, Regulatory Manager Dan Stuckless added, “That’s 
a good point. […] It all ties back.” (FG-02, 21 August 2017). The staff posited that the strategies 
they take to defend Mikisew’s interests intersect. The group discussions that arose added depth 
and clarity to the answers recorded. The interactive quality of focus groups, which is highlighted 
by Morgan (1997), renders this method particularly useful when examining sensitive or 
contentious topics, and when analyzing policy (Kahan 2001).  
Focus groups also provide an opportunity to review social models and theories 
collectively with informants as they are being developed in the field (Agar and MacDonald 
1995). Conducting a single focus group with GIR personnel was well timed for the end of my 
stay. For instance, my participant observation and 13 interviews reinforced the notion that 
responsibilities of consultation had been devolved from government to industry in northern 
Alberta. During the focus group, when I had decades of collective experience in the room, I was 
able to ask, “Do you agree with that? Can you expand or reflect on that idea?” The resulting 
discussions were formative, as the group then launched into a heated discussion on the state of 
governance in the oil sands region, reflecting upon relevant lines of inquiry and their respective 
limitations and relevance as I struggled with the same ideas.  
My choice of a focus group for the final investigative piece of my research was also a 
matter of convenience. The lightning pace of work at the GIR made the moderation of a sole 
focus group with Mikisew representatives preferable to the coordination of another half-dozen 
one-on-one interviews. However, I found the selection of a focus group for this final set of 
informants to be invaluable, as the discussions the focus group dynamic spurred were 
unparalleled in depth relative to my open-ended interviews.  
2.3.4 Document & policy analysis 
Policy development is an act of negotiating conflicting values, Weaver (1981) posits; this 
becomes apparent in analysing policies and the processes that precede them. Document and 
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policy analysis complements the abovementioned methods; such analyses demonstrate the role 
of bureaucratic documentation in structuring Indigenous-state relations (Weaver 1981), and in 
legitimizing development on Indigenous lands (Espeland 1993). Researching policy has served 
the purpose of exploring the diverse, evolving governance mechanisms and regulatory regimes at 
play in developing northern Alberta’s landscapes. I have analyzed three primary sets of 
documentation. The first set concerns regional land use planning, focusing on the Lower 
Athabasca Regional Plan (LARP) (2012) submitted under the Alberta Land Stewardship Act 
(ALSA) (2009), the LARP Review Panel Report (2015), and related submissions from six First 
Nations. The second set of documentation consists of policies and directives related to the 
province’s regulation of reclamation. This included Directive 074 (AER 2009), Directive 085 
(AER 2015a), and the Tailings Management Framework (TMF) (AER 2015b). The third set of 
documents concerns world heritage. I assessed the Convention Concerning the Protection of the 
World Cultural and Natural Heritage (1972), as well as UNESCO documentation pertaining to 
Wood Buffalo National Park. This included its inscription as a world heritage site (IUCN 1983), 
Mikisew’s petition to the World Heritage Committee (MCFN 2014), and the subsequent 
Reactive Monitoring Mission report (World Heritage Centre and IUCN 2017). I also assessed 
relevant policies, documents, and reports on an ongoing basis, as they arose at the GIR. My 
analysis has capitalized upon techniques that ensure the optimal synthesis of relevant literature 
(see Onwuegbuzie, Leech, and Collins 2012). As social anthropologists Shore and Wright (2011) 
assert, policies are fundamental organizing principles in society. Assessing the policies and 
legislation that inform and delineate energy governance in Northern Alberta therefore constitutes 
an essential component of my research agenda.  
2.4 Data Analysis & Organization 
The validity of research is strengthened through comparing various streams of inquiry, which 
data analysis allows. I recorded my interviews and focus group with an audio recording device. 
Upon my return from the field, I then transcribed these recordings for thematic and content 
analysis. I employed NVivo software to further my interpretive assessment. I also coded meeting 
minutes and fieldnotes. Firstly, I took a deductive approach to listing the general themes covered 
through data collection. Following that, I identified more specific themes in an exploratory 
fashion, in order to develop iterative categorization schemes. I then organized the resultant 
emergent codes within a shifting list of general themes. Beyond this open-ended, iterative 
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thematic analysis, I engaged in content analysis. Ultimately, I synthesized these sources of data. 
My analysis dovetailed transcripts from interviews and my focus group with findings from 
participant observation, in order to obtain richer understandings, as Agar and MacDonald (1995), 
as well as Swenson, Griswold, and Kleiber (1992), exemplify. Employing a range of 
complementary methods has enabled me to cultivate insights of greater depth, and to triangulate 
and cross-reference my findings. Data analysis advanced over several months as a long process 
of meaning-making and investigation.  
Chapter Three features the analysis of the employment histories of a base of individuals, 
in order to explore ties between major governance sectors in the region. I reviewed my meeting 
minutes from the four months of fieldwork and searched the names of all individuals mentioned 
in meetings on LinkedIn, a professional networking website. I accessed these individuals’ 
publicly available online profiles to mine their employment histories over the last 20 years. In 
order to expand the network I surveyed, I employed Russell’s (2011) data mining framework to 
move beyond the original convenience sample amassed in the field (approx. 45 individuals) by 
gathering related contacts through LinkedIn’s algorithm. I used suggestions supplied by 
LinkedIn to add 80 individuals to my sample, filtering out those whose professional histories do 
not relate to energy governance in Alberta. I then collected the occupational data of the full 
sample (n=125). I have depicted the professional trajectories of this sample according to their 
sectoral involvement in oil sands governance (Appendix D).5 This sampling strategy is not 
without fault; without knowing the full population involved in energy governance in northern 
Alberta, I cannot claim to have secured a representative sample. Moreover, my sampling method 
only includes those who have subscribed to LinkedIn’s services. The challenges of this 
preliminary investigation, and the need for future related research, are discussed in Chapter Five. 
A final note on focus group and interview citations: Throughout the thesis, I cite these 
data sources according to a coding schematic that identifies the method in shorthand (i.e. I or FG, 
for interview or focus group respectively), followed by a numbering scheme that represents the                                                         
5 The individuals within this sample have been anonymized. In this work, their places of employment also 
go unnamed; it is simply the governance sector in which they work that is taken into account here. 
Individuals whose professional backgrounds were not available over a substantial portion of the last 20 
years were excluded (i.e., if they were professionally active throughout the sample period but a substantial 
amount of these records were unavailable, they were omitted). Employment outside Alberta, or of 
seemingly limited relevance to energy governance in the province, was not categorized according to the 
sectoral categories set forth here. In future research, it may be useful to assess movement within sectors 
(i.e., employers), as well as between sectors. 
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chronological order in which I engaged with these participants throughout the fieldwork. For 
example, I-4 would refer to the fourth interviewee. These codes will be included in parentheses, 
followed by the date of the encounter. The participants requested varying degrees of anonymity: 
some did not want their names or workplaces listed; others were comfortable providing these 
details in full. While details are incorporated into the text as privacy requests allowed, the coding 
schematic enables me to delineate their respective contributions in the work that follows. 
2.5 Delineating the Field 
The limits of my research site were set by my placement at the GIR, and the extent to which I 
was able to accompany and support the team over the summer. Prior to leaving for Fort 
McMurray, Dr. Westman and I assumed that I would spend the large majority of my time in the 
field within the city limits, hoping I could perhaps make it to Fort Chipewyan for one or two 
visits, in order to see the home community and engage with band members on the land base. I 
could never have predicted the full geographical and political breadth of my work, and the ways 
in which the boundaries of my field site metamorphosed over the four-month stretch with 
Mikisew: Its limits came to incorporate such far-flung spaces as federal boardrooms in 
Edmonton; hotels in Calgary; sacred gathering areas in Fort Smith, Northwest Territories; World 
Heritage Committee meetings in Krakow, Poland; and much of Fort Chipewyan. I sat in on 
exchanges and work sessions in hotel lobbies, restaurants, late-night haunts, airports, and in 
boats, planes, and trucks. My chief informants were those involved in championing Mikisew’s 
interests in the politics of energy extraction, based primarily out of the GIR office, with whom I 
engaged on a day-to-day basis. I drew a smaller, secondary group of informants from the broader 
network of individuals that frequent the political spaces of energy governance alongside 
Mikisew, as well as from MCFN membership, although I had less opportunity to engage in 
formal interviews with the latter group. The GIR office’s position as a consultation hub and 
representative body provided novel research experiences and fruitful grounds for exploring 
governance processes, as well as the opportunity to examine a range of perspectives on the 
politics of managing industrial extraction. Ethnographic engagement has enabled me to attend to 
the contentious social processes through which extraction in northern Alberta is negotiated. My 
immersive fieldwork has challenged and enhanced my analytical capacity as an anthropological 
researcher.  
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Chapter Three: Energy Governance in Alberta: Shedding Light on a “Black Box” 
3.1 Introduction 
Energy governance, or the political management of the energy sector (Van de Graaf and Colgan 
2016), has transformed in Alberta in recent years. This chapter attends to the socio-political 
conditions of energy governance in Alberta by examining three major facets of the consultative 
and regulatory environment: (1) the degree of regulatory capture (a form of corruption) exhibited 
within the province, (2) the emergence of a network of consultation and regulatory specialists 
constituting an “epistemic community” (Haas 1992) in the oil sands region, and (3) recent 
reforms that aim to combat the negative reputation accrued by Alberta’s governance of extractive 
industries (see Adkin 2016; Shrivastava and Stefanick). This chapter investigates the manners in 
which energy governance has evolved in recent years, shedding light on the various actors and 
communities involved in negotiating energy extraction in Alberta. Drawing from ethnographic 
research, this chapter investigates regulatory capture in the province. As legal scholar Kwak 
(2014) outlines, regulatory capture is “a process by which regulation […] is consistently or 
repeatedly directed away from the public interest and toward the interests of the regulated 
industry by the intent and action of the industry itself” (73). I explore regulatory capture by 
documenting the presence of a revolving door between major governance actors (i.e., 
government, industry, community), as workers move between positions representing these 
various sectors. The revolving door arguably creates a conflict of interest; regulatory 
enforcement tends to weaken among staff with a history of prior industry affiliations (Makkai 
and Braithwaite 1992: 61). The revolving door thus constitutes an important predictor of capture 
(Makkai and Braithwaite 1992; Tabakovik & Wollmann 2017). I assess the revolving door by 
tracing the employment history of a sample of those engaged in consultation and regulatory work 
in Alberta (see Chapter Two). I also attend to conflicting notions of public interest as one 
component of captured regulatory systems. These conditions combine to largely sideline 
Indigenous perspectives, as well as Aboriginal and treaty rights considerations. A brief 
assessment of the regulatory treatment of reclamation, and particularly tailings ponds, helps to 
demonstrate the pragmatic reverberations of regulatory capture in the oil sands region. As a 
whole, this chapter explores the notion that energy governance in northern Alberta is governed 
through conventionally closed political and social spaces (Bowness and Hudson 2014; Fluker 
2015; Taylor and Freidel 2011). In doing so, this ethnographically grounded systems-level 
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analysis helps frame the chapters that follow, which attend to strategic Indigenous mobilization 
on matters of energy governance. 
3.2 Governance in the Oil Sands Region 
3.2.1 Capitalism and the state 
The oil sands are the key driver of Alberta’s economy (Stewart 2017: 1), and hold a central 
position within provincial and federal political economies (Adkin 2016; Richards and Pratt 
1979). Political economy is an interdisciplinary tradition that assesses the relationships between 
political factors and economic conditions. Since the 1960s, anthropologists have employed 
political economic concepts to explain changes in sociocultural systems (Ervin 2015). As 
political economists suggest, the governance of capitalist states is influenced by economic elites 
due to the pre-eminence of private ownership (Miliband 1969: 173). Non-state actors, such as 
industry and Indigenous communities, contest and negotiate industrial activity alongside the state 
through a variety of emergent institutional mechanisms (Slowey 2008; see Figure 3.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, despite these competing influences, the business class holds decisive coercive power 
(Miliband 1969; Roseberry 1988). As a result, Miliband (1969) suggests, “The people in charge 
of the state have generally been strongly imbued with the belief that the ‘national interest’ was 
Figure 3.1. Oil sands governance mechanisms. Inspired by Lemos and Agrawal (2006: 310), this 
rendition of the original framework places the market above the community. This denotes the 
former’s fulfilling of state responsibilities, and the manner in which community is traditionally seen 
as a recipient of decisions relating to extraction, rather than an active partner. 
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bound up with the well-being of capitalist enterprise” (64); there is thus a conflation of business 
interests and the public interest. The partnership of state and capital undermines democratic 
principles, as economic growth becomes a primary concern among decision-makers (Miliband 
1969: 65). 
3.2.2 Neoliberalism in Alberta  
Neoliberalism, a theory of political economy, constitutes a form of political liberalism 
that favours economic competition and free-market capitalism (Ganti 2014: 91-96). 
Neoliberalism centres corporations as governance actors, as the state is reconfigured and 
“hollowed out” (Reed and Bruyneel 2010: 648). In the oil sands region, state powers are 
withdrawing in favour of augmenting market-driven solutions, deregulation, and economic 
competition (Slowey 2008; Urquhart 2018). Government has devolved governance 
responsibilities and power to industry (Bowness and Hudson 2014; Hitch 2006; Joly and 
Westman 2017; Wanvik 2016). A dialectical relationship between extractive industries and their 
critics, such as Indigenous peoples, is another critical feature of neoliberal governance (Kirsch 
2014: 18), and one that is apparent in the oil sands region (Shrivastava and Stefanick 2015).  
Studying contemporary governance necessitates a review of the historical emergence of 
relevant policy (Roseberry 1988: 161). Alberta’s fiscal policies on oil and gas have maintained a 
high degree of consistency over the last century (Phillips 2008; Stewart 2017). One exception 
documented by Stewart (2017) is the delegation of further leadership to the oil sands industry to 
“promote development on its terms” since the early 1990s, in order to enhance private 
investment (1-2). In the 20th century, Richards and Pratt (1979) note, establishing a favourable 
investment climate became a central priority in Alberta. Prioritizing the maintenance of a low tax 
rate has led Alberta to rely heavily on the rents from extraction (Adkin 2016; Shrivastava and 
Stefanick 2015). As a result, Carter, Fraser, and Zalik (2017: 61) characterize Alberta as an 
“energy-dependent” subnational government. Ongoing social research reinforces a hypothesis set 
forth by MacPherson (1953), as well as Richards and Pratt (1979), decades ago: The royalties 
harnessed from extraction are of fundamental importance to the economies of Alberta. Between 
1996 and 2008, non-renewable resources constituted 30 percent of the province’s revenue, and as 
much as 51 percent during one fiscal year (Carter and Zalik 2016: 56). As will be explored 
further in this chapter, Alberta’s structural reliance on oil sands revenues has significant 
governance implications (Urquhart 2018): It prompts “rent-seeking behaviour” by the province 
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(Carter and Zalik 2016: 57-58), such as the avoidance of cumulative impact assessments, and the 
minimization of public involvement in decision-making related to the oil sands (Carter, Fraser, 
and Zalik 2017: 74-75). Political economic literature explores the extensive implications of oil 
extraction and fossil fuel-centred economies for the state of democracy in Alberta (Adkin 2016; 
Carter 2014; Shrivastava and Stefanick 2015). The Alberta context aligns with Miliband’s (1969) 
early theorizations on state transformations under capitalism. While I do not necessarily advocate 
for a Marxist approach, I take a heuristic stance towards political economic theory in assessing 
my specific regional context and subject matter – a trend identified among ethnographers by 
Roseberry (1988: 172) some decades ago. 
3.2.3 Studying oil sands governance 
Political scholars often supplant theoretical models tied to developing nation-states and 
neoliberalism, such as the resource curse (Parlee 2015) and the petro-state (Carter 2014), to 
Alberta. Yet political economic research can negate the lived experiences of governance actors, 
as Roseberry (1988: 162) and Ganti (2014) acknowledge. Such structural analyses tend to reify 
state institutions, Carter and Zalik (2016: 63) reaffirm. Notable exceptions are emerging, with 
anthropologists in particular contributing to the study of ongoing and dynamic governmental 
processes in Alberta, such as Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) (Baker and Westman 
2018; McCormack 2016; Westman 2013). Expanding upon the political economic frameworks 
outlined above to incorporate a political ecology perspective enables fruitful analysis. Political 
ecology, an emergent interdisciplinary field, investigates the manners in which humans and 
institutions interact with physical environments (Ervin 2015). Political ecology also examines the 
relationships between environmental issues and political, economic, and social conditions (Adkin 
2016). Together, political-economic and political-ecological frameworks consider environmental 
problems through assessing political spaces as social universes as well as nexuses of power 
(Roseberry 1988). In extractive zones, shifting relationships between industry, government 
bodies, and communities are negotiated alongside projects on an ongoing basis (Rogers 2015). 
My work addresses the need for additional ethnographic research on the oil complex (Rogers 
2015; Watts 2005) in a manner that attends to the lived experiences and perspectives of the 
individuals who actively negotiate energy extraction in Alberta (Joly and Westman 2017: 26-27). 
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3.2.4 Regulatory capture 
While I was in the field, representatives of Mikisew and Fort McKay First Nations often 
used the concept of “regulatory capture” to describe energy governance dynamics in the region. 
“It just perfectly fits here in northern Alberta,” the Mikisew GIR’s Government Relations 
Manager affirmed (FG-03, 21 August 2017). Regulatory capture describes a form of corruption 
in which interest groups, such as corporate entities, hold significant sway over regulatory bodies. 
While the political economic theory of regulatory capture emerged in the mid-twentieth century 
(Bernstein 1955), the onset of the financial crisis in 2007 brought new attention to the concept 
among economists (e.g., Buiter 2008; Young 2012). Researchers have only explicitly tied 
capture to the oil sands context in passing (see Shrivastava and Stefanick 2015). A considerable 
base of literature has developed on the political context of extraction in Alberta (e.g., 
MacPherson 1953; Richards and Pratt 1979; Urquhart 2010). Yet little academic investigation 
focuses directly upon regulatory capture in the province.  
In interviews, Indigenous informants and consultation professionals working for Mikisew 
and Fort McKay First Nations commonly referred to the province’s “flawed regulatory process” 
(FG-01, 21 August 2017). One Chipewyan consultation worker with two decades of experience 
in the region labeled participation in Alberta’s consultation mechanisms as “a waste of time, a 
waste of resources,” and “a broken process” that does nothing to meet communities’ interests (I-
08, 6 August 2017). Of course, not all informants exhibited such a degree of distress over current 
consultation practices. 
Regulatory capture occurs on a spectrum, ranging from direct collusion and financial 
corruption, to well-meaning but industry-oriented (i.e., thoroughly pro-development, pro-growth) 
regulators, who develop misguided assumptions about the relative weight of extraction’s costs 
and benefits (Westman 2013). Due to the influence of private firms in government entities that 
have been captured, there is a gap between actual and perceived public interests (Shapiro 2012; 
Morley et al. 2017). As Kwak (2014) explains, “an industry might consciously set out to induce 
its regulators to identify with industry members and their interests, and those regulators might 
make decisions because their conception of the public interest has been colonized by industry” 
(79). Capture is visible when the public interest mirrors corporate values, and not shared societal 
preferences (Barnetson 2015).  
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Attending to the social and cultural processes of politics and power is critical (Roseberry 
1988). My analysis explores the ongoing, relationship-based dynamics of capture in practice (see 
Kwak 2014). I attend particularly to the concept of cultural capture (Kwak 2014), which stresses 
that regulatory capture can occur through social interactions and cultural exchange.6 Political 
economic problems of the sort that arise in institutional matrices are well suited for ethnographic 
assessment (Roseberry 1988). Indeed, the actual relations and mechanisms of influence through 
which regulatory values and notions of public interest are transformed necessitate immersive 
fieldwork of the variety I have espoused.  
3.3 Witnessing Capture in the Oil Sands 
Today, regulatory capture is assumed to be an accomplished and presumably irreversible fact 
among community representatives and consultants in northern Alberta. Dan Stuckless, a 
Manager at the GIR reflected, “The only people who don’t see it are the ones that have been 
captured,” (FG-02, 21 August 2017) arguing that the reality of capture is apparent in Alberta. 
Stuckless is President of the Cumulative Effects Management Association (CEMA)7 and has 
worked in three Indigenous consultation offices over the last decade and a half. Throughout my 
fieldwork, contacts commonly used the idea of capture to describe the current governance 
environment. In meetings with the largest oil producers in the region, private firms did not push 
back against GIR staff’s assertions of capture. The manifestation of regulatory capture within my 
ethnographic research has led to its primacy within this chapter. 
3.3.1 The revolving door: Moving between seats at decision-making tables 
One manner in which regulated firms exert cultural and social influence upon staff at the 
regulator crystallizes is the “revolving door” (Nadel 1976): The revolving door is at play when 
there is a steady flow of employment opportunities and personnel between industry and 
regulatory agencies, as well as other sectors with major stakes in the regulation of economic 
activity (Tabakovik and Wollmann 2017). To assess the presence of the revolving door 
phenomenon in Alberta, I have depicted the professional trajectories of a convenience sample 
(n=125; see Chapter Two) according to their sectoral involvement in oil sands governance                                                         6 Researchers have differentiated between different forms of regulatory capture to add specificity to the 
theoretical framework. Of particular salience are cultural capture, as well as information capture, and 
cognitive regulatory capture (Buiter 2008).  
7 CEMA operated for over 12 years as a leading multi-stakeholder group in the Regional Municipality of 
Wood Buffalo, advising government policy and regulatory frameworks pertaining to the oil sands region. 
After CEMA’s funding was cut in 2016, its operations were suspended. 
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(Appendix D). While this analysis merits reproduction on a wider scale for generalizability and 
accuracy, my findings suggest that individuals move quite commonly between government, 
industry, and other sectors engaged in energy governance in Alberta.   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
While this investigation merits expansion through future research, my sample suggests 
that it is typical to move from working for a government body (e.g., Alberta Environment and 
Parks or the AER) to private industry, or vice versa. Of the 125 individuals in my sample, one 
quarter (26%) had not worked for multiple major governance actors (i.e., government, regulator, 
industry, or Indigenous community) in the past 20 years (Figure 3.2, above). In other words, over 
the past two decades, a significant majority (62+11+1%) of those surveyed had occupied various 
positions in negotiating energy extraction.  
In Alberta, the frequency with which employees move through the revolving door is 
indicative of both material and cultural capture. As a lawyer retained by Mikisew pointed out, 
one glaring example of this arises from the largest pending open pit oil sands project, a 
particularly contentious proposal from Teck Limited (McDermott 2018): A Crown Consultation 
Coordinator moved directly from the federal agency currently overseeing the review, where they 
had worked for 15 years, to a position as the Regulatory Manager for the corporate firm vying 
for federal approval (pers. comm. 21 October 2017; Appendix D). This is a timely case of a high-
powered individual cycling through the revolving door. Social ties – as would be accrued by the 
Figure 3.2. Degree of sectoral involvement in major energy governance sectors (i.e. 
government, regulatory, industry, or Indigenous community). This figure depicts the 
percentage of my total sample (n=125) that has obtained employment in 1, 2, 3, or 4 
sectors that negotiate extraction in Alberta, within the last 20 years. 
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Coordinator in their previous position – may have significant reverberations upon governance 
processes (see Miliband 1969). High profile examples of the revolving door phenomenon have 
garnered media attention and political debate for over a decade. For instance, in 2007, Suncor 
executive Heather Kennedy was appointed to Assistant Deputy Minister for the Oil Sands 
Sustainable Development Secretariat (CBC News 2007). Then-NDP Leader Brian Mason 
responded, “It’s not only unusual, it’s completely unacceptable […]. It’s an incredible conflict of 
interest the likes of which I haven’t seen from this government” (Pratt 2007). Despite public 
outcry, Kennedy remained a Suncor employee throughout (Nikiforuk 2010: 178). These 
paradigmatic examples demonstrate the manner in which career mobility may constitute and 
exemplify capture. 
In the political spheres that oversee extraction in Alberta, it appears rare for professionals 
not to have stepped through the revolving door at least once or twice throughout their career. 
Personnel can thus act as decision-makers within both economic and political spheres. Business 
scholars Tabakovik and Wollmann (2017) posit that although the revolving door is partly a by-
product of firms’ desire for workers with regulatory experience, this phenomenon can hinder 
regulator impartiality and discourage the protection of the public interest. A campaign manager 
assisting Mikisew at UNESCO reflected on the sway of corporate interest in the regulatory 
system, saying, “It’s an interesting lesson in where power lies. And the limitations of 
democracy” (I-02, 7 July 2017).  
Alberta’s regulatory funding structure also merits discussion. The independence of any 
regulators who are funded in large part by the industry they are meant to regulate has been a 
source of contention (Carpenter and Moss 2014). In Alberta, 100% of the regulator’s funding is 
accrued from industry through fees levied on fossil fuel extraction (AER n.d.).8 Some 
economists assure cost-recovery organizations – such as the National Energy Board (NEB) and 
the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) – are independent despite the manner in which their 
funding structures tie them to industry. Yet as Nikiforuk (2011) asserts, the AER’s financial 
                                                        
8 It should be noted that this number has only risen following regulatory reforms. The Energy Resources 
Conservation Board (ERCB) received extensive criticism for relying on the bulk of its funding from 
industry (Nikiforuk 2011), although reports only set it at 50-70% of its budget (Fortney 2009 reported it 
at 58%).  
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survival relies directly upon the success of the firms the regulator is meant to limit and oversee.9 
These financial ties have led critics such as landowners, Indigenous communities, and NGOs to 
raise critical questions about AER’s claims that it is able to represent the public interest and 
balance conflicting societal pressures (Pratt 2013). Many of these critics have branded the AER 
and its predecessors as partners of industry, rather than oversight bodies ensuring the responsible 
development of the province’s natural capital (e.g., National Farmers Union 2013). Alberta is a 
resource-based jurisdiction, Shrivastava and Stefanick (2015: 20) underscore. The mutual 
dependency of private and public entities in one such oil-dominated economic system is a critical 
structural condition for governance in the province (Adkin 2016). 
3.3.2 An emergent epistemic community in energy governance 
Where there is a high degree of interchange and networking between regulators and 
regulated firms, legal scholar Bagley (2010) explains, “The agency may come to see the world 
the way its regulated entities do.” Social interactions increase regulatory actors’ exposure to 
industry representatives. Speaking specifically to capture, Kwak (2014) outlines three primary 
mechanisms of influence: group identification, status, and relationship networks. Over time, 
recurrent interactions and camaraderie in a professional sphere may lead individuals to perceive 
other consultation and regulatory workers as peers within their in-group. This fosters what Haas 
(1992) describes as an epistemic community, or “a network of professionals with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (3). The specialized knowledge required to skilfully 
navigate the complex and ever-changing regulatory system in Alberta distinguishes these 
individuals. Expertise is apparent in actors’ specialized linguistic repertoires (Carr 2010): As 
Carr (a linguistic anthropologist) documents, technical terms and acronyms reinforce expert 
status. In Alberta, discussions and meetings pertaining to energy governance are infused with 
regulatory and consultation jargon (e.g., Joly 2017). Linguistic capital is harnessed for political 
gain and tactical advantage within such negotiations (Westman and Schreyer 2014: 135). 
Colleagues and representatives I met in the field employed acronyms when referring to nearly all 
participatory forums, government bodies, and relevant legislation and regulations. As a result, it 
took me weeks of ethnographic immersion to familiarize myself with the acronyms and other                                                         
9 As Zalik (2016) explores, it is worth noting that consultation offices also rely on industry for funding, 
and are thus structurally tied to project proponents as well (see Chapter Four). 
 33 
discursive practices that dominate political spaces governing the oil sands region. Specialized 
linguistic signals, such as acronyms and technical terminology, reinforce the exclusivity and 
membership boundaries of the epistemic community.10  
In neoliberal economic systems, governance processes exhibit close ties between 
corporate and state institutions (Ganti 2014). This fosters ideal conditions for the emergence of 
cultural capture, and the revolving door phenomenon. According to cultural capture, regulators 
come to align their worldviews and priorities with those of regulated firms, and ultimately rule in 
favour of such firms, due to their ideological influence (Kwak 2014). Cultural capture thus 
extends the impetus of capture beyond material self-interest, to recognize that social interactions 
and influence also impact regulatory decision-making (Kwak 2014: 79). As Haas’ (1992) model 
sets forth, epistemic communities come to share normative and causal beliefs, notions of validity, 
and policy enterprise. As a result, regulators may gradually adopt corporate objectives and 
interests, which centre oil production and economic returns, as Shrivastava and Stefanick (2015: 
3-4) underscore.  
In Alberta’s political-economic system, shared governance responsibilities such as 
consultation promote the rise of an epistemic community tied to regulation in the province. 
Hoberg and Phillips (2011) document this state-market alignment of interests at Alberta’s Multi-
Stakeholder Committee in 2006-2007. This multi-sectoral governance structure was designed to 
make plans and recommendations for public consultation on policy and management principles 
designed to oversee energy extraction. While engaged in the Multi-Stakeholder Committee, 
industry and the provincial government voted together 97% of the time on the 120 
recommendations produced by the committee (516). Hoberg and Phillips (2011) suggest this 
consistent voting alignment enhanced their ability to defend oil sands extraction from its critics. 
Such strategic alignment contributes to a longer-term tendency to limit public input and 
participation in energy governance in Alberta, as noted by Fluker (2015). Relationship-based 
incentives, such as the accruement of social capital (Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988), promote 
pro-market cooperation and shared disregard for the internalization of the costs and trade-offs 
that are inherent in extraction. A UNESCO Campaign Manager consulting for Mikisew had                                                         
10 For instance, Joly (2017) chronicles the pre-eminence of technical knowledge at post-extractive 
reclamation meetings. This leads Indigenous voices to be subsumed as non-expert, which operates to the 
detriment of multi-stakeholder processes and resultant deliverables meant to inform industry and 
government policy. 
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previously worked in Australia’s treasury department for over a dozen years, overseeing the 
assessment process for foreign investment in mining. She reflected on the pro-market 
cooperation she witnessed there, drawing a comparison between the Alberta context and that of 
Australia. The Campaign Manager explained,  
The most powerful companies develop new policies and new frameworks to make it 
easier for them to […] comply. You change the policy to suit the company in consultation 
with them (the company). [I-02, 7 July 2017] 
 
The informant reflected on her time leading a federal department tasked with overseeing mineral 
extraction in Australia, maintaining that policies were “strongly influenced by the companies, 
who wanted basically to have less red tape around their pathway to develop new mining projects, 
and they largely succeeded” (I-02, 7 July 2017). Mining and oil companies, she asserted, are part 
of an industry that is “pretty much used to getting its way almost anywhere in the world” (I-02, 7 
July 2017). Much as Kirsch (2014) posits, the informant reinforced that close ties between 
industry and government staff are common in extractive hotbeds like Australia and Alberta. She 
concluded,  
I learnt an enormous amount in that period, not just on how industry operates, but on how 
politically powerful it is. The people, if you like, who had the most sway on government, 
were certainly the miners. [I-02, 7 July 2017]  
 
The Campaign Manager thus suggests that the rapprochement between industry and government 
is interpersonal in nature, echoing Miliband (1969). Social interactions and influence advance 
capture. As a result, over time, those instated in government to defend publics from harm 
associated with extraction grow reluctant to do so (Fluker 2015). Ultimately, the regulator begins 
to operate in defiance of its purpose. 
My placement at the GIR shed light on the inner-workings of the distinct, emerging class 
of “knowledge-based experts” (Haas 1992: 2), which unites representatives from government 
and industry, and increasingly from communities as well. These workers are distinguished by the 
ease with which they move through the regulatory system. I met government representatives in 
meetings in Fort McMurray’s provincial building, and then crossed paths with the same groups 
lingering around one of Fort Chipewyan’s main restaurants following participatory forums and 
meetings. Sitting in airport eateries across western Canada, GIR staff and I would turn around to 
find representatives from corporate firms and neighbouring IRCs in adjacent seating. While in 
the field with the GIR, I consistently found myself sharing meeting spaces, taxicabs, and catered 
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coffee breaks and lunches with representatives from government and industry groups. 
Camaraderie may easily develops within these spheres of energy governance, especially given 
the recent proliferation of engagement sessions, which prompts multi-sectoral work and 
prolonged contact. Increased interaction facilitates networks and group identification, which may 
encourage capture (Kwak 2014). As Buiter (2008) explains, it is through social interaction that 
“those in charge of the relevant state entity internalise, as if by osmosis, the objectives, interests, 
and perception of reality of the vested interest they are meant to regulate.” The alignment of 
industry and government officials results from the influence of private firms’ representatives 
(Miliband 1969), which is socially transmitted (Buiter 2008). As political economic scholars set 
forth, consequently, the state comes to embody a complex of industry and government (Miliband 
1969), undermining democratic decision-making (Shrivastava and Stefanick 2015), and 
cementing economic interests as paramount in Alberta (Adkin 2016). 
3.3.3 Capture in Indigenous consultation offices? 
Indigenous peoples’ representatives are not fully immune to such dynamics of capture. 
Two of the Mikisew staff with whom I worked closely had previously worked for corporate 
firms. In an interview, one such employee highlighted the manner in which her previous work 
with industry and environmental groups enhanced her current work, saying, 
Right now I represent one sector, but it’s really important that you understand where the 
other sectors are coming from – especially if you’re trying to find that middle ground in 
consultation, you need to know what the drivers are. [I-05, 28 July 2017]  
 
The worker felt her regulatory expertise was enhanced by experience in other sectors. Another 
informant described her own employment trajectory similarly: she had spent a decade 
representing a large corporation in Regulatory and Indigenous Relations, before engaging on 
behalf of a First Nation for the following decade. I asked her to reflect on that transition, 
mentioning that it appeared she had moved “from one side of the table to the other,” during our 
interview: 
It was done a bit on purpose, because I think the value of recognizing where each person 
[stands] – how they approach issues and what issues they face internally – helps you to be 
able to find solutions when you’re working from various perspectives. You can be a bit 
more appreciative of what drives them, what motivates them, what helps them make 
decisions, what’s within their area to make decisions… [I-05, 28 July 2017] 
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This informant’s response reinforces the value of occupying positions in different governance 
sectors in northern Alberta. These individuals’ abilities to move from industry to Indigenous 
community offices, however, also opens up such staff to scrutiny, as they have ostensibly moved 
through the revolving door between governance sectors. Due to their previous ties to industry, 
these staff may be susceptible to assertions of patronage as well. Thus, offices like the GIR may 
not be entirely immune to the criticisms they level against government regarding capture. Yet the 
repercussions of this potential variant of capture are less far-flung, as such offices are not 
charged with representing the public interest at large, and GIRs and IRCs are fundamentally 
caught within a pro-business political system (Adkin 2016; Shrivastava and Stefanick 2015). 
Nevertheless, the intersection between regulatory capture, the revolving door, and staff within 
GIRs and IRCs merits further research. 
3.3.4 Notions of public interest 
Alberta’s cabinet and regulator, as well as their federal counterparts, are required to make 
decisions based on the public interest (Fluker 2011; Stefanick 2015). Yet as a Government 
Relations Consultant explained, public interest “has always been strongly economic” in Alberta 
(I-09, 10 August 2017; also see Fluker 2015). “The realities of needing the energy sector as a 
supporting and voting member of your government is very rooted,” a Dene Consultation 
Coordinator added (I-08, 6 August 2017), reinforcing notions that the interests of industry have 
long been prioritized in provincial government processes. Indeed, my informants commonly 
contended that the regulator tends to serve only one section of society – namely, industry. These 
assertions strongly align the Alberta context with the central tenets of regulatory capture. Once 
captured, public administration and political scholar Bernstein sets forth, “regulatory agencies go 
through a ‘life cycle’ that sees the public interest progressively subordinated to the interests of 
the regulated industry” (Makkai and Braithwaite 1992: 62). A recent study on regulatory 
excellence commissioned by the AER warned that regulators often fail to ensure they operate 
justly in a manner that serves their entire publics, instead focusing on techno-scientific 
competence (Coglianese 2015).11 
My fieldwork largely reaffirmed contentions that oil industry interests and public 
interests have been merged in Alberta (e.g., Stefanick 2015; Urquhart 2018). During my first                                                         
11 Many scholars express doubts about the claims of expertise in Alberta’s regulatory community, as 
deficiencies in socio-cultural expertise are increasingly well documented (see Baker and Westman 2018; 
Joly and Westman 2017; McCormack 2016). 
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interview, a young Mikisew member stated plainly, regarding decision-making on industrial 
extraction in northern Alberta, “It’s more about dollar value, it’s not about what we’re leaving 
behind, and it really should just be about what we’re leaving behind” (I-01, 15 June 2017). First 
Nations members and representatives commonly articulated that the Alberta government’s notion 
of the public interest is single-minded and financially oriented. Much as MacPherson (1953) 
argued in the mid-twentieth century, maintaining a business-friendly climate still appears to be 
the province’s major priority (Adkin 2016; Carter 2014; Hoberg and Phillips 2011).  
Mark Gustafson, a lawyer for Mikisew’s consultation team, recalled being in a meeting 
with the province’s legal counsel in which the government representative bluntly stated, 
“Alberta’s job is to make decisions in public interest, and the public interest will always 
[outweigh] Mikisew” (I-04, 25 July 2017). Gustafson reinforced that royalties are “the only thing 
that [government] will consider for public interest” (I-04, 25 July 2017). Related anecdotes and 
assertions were commonly shared with me in the field, reinforcing that the government’s narrow 
conception of public interest largely excludes Indigenous interests. Gustafson elaborated,  
It seems like it’s the financial benefit that can be spread around the province in terms of 
employment and revenue – the royalty stream – that outweighs the impacts to individuals 
and their way of life. That can’t be right. [I-04, 25 July 2017] 
 
The public interest is thus misconstrued in Alberta, sidelining Indigenous perspectives (Slowey 
and Stefanick 2015). This is inappropriate – I argue – in light of the constitutional protection of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights (see Newman 2014a), as well as Supreme Court jurisprudence 
(Clyde River 2017; Rio Tinto Alcan 2010). 
According to one participant, in the past, Canadian law has been very nebulous in 
addressing how Aboriginal and treaty rights fit into the public interest (I-04, 25 July 2017). More 
recently, after decades of Indigenous resistance (Longley 2015), and increasingly broad public 
outcry over the governance of extraction (McNeill and Thornton 2017), the courts have begun 
challenging the public interest tests that regulators and the Crown undertake regarding energy 
development. In Clyde River (2017), the Supreme Court of Canada noted, “A project 
authorization that breaches the constitutionally protected rights of Indigenous peoples cannot 
serve the public interest” (para. 40). The Supreme Court thus reaffirmed that Indigenous rights 
must be granted due consideration for a project to be in the public interest, adding that the duty 
to consult “gives rise to a special public interest that supersedes other concerns typically 
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considered by tribunals tasked with assessing the public interest” (Clyde River 2017). Gustafson, 
who has represented a number of First Nations in the oil sands region over the last decade, 
reflected upon recent jurisprudence (Clyde River 2017; Rio Tinto Alcan 2010) to note that at the 
very least, from a strictly legalistic perspective, public interest requires that governments act 
constitutionally; therefore any rights infringement and inadequate consultation defies the public 
interest (I-04, 25 July 2017). Recent Canadian case law indicates the need to reform 
governments’ notions of public interest. While competing societal needs must still be balanced 
(Chippewas of the Thames First Nation v. Enbridge Pipelines Inc. 2017), present-day Supreme 
Court rulings highlight the need for a more robust public interest test that explicitly incorporates 
Indigenous rights. Recent jurisprudence is effectively nullifying opaque and economically 
oriented notions of public interest, and reaffirming the imperative of added regulatory 
transparency. 
Aboriginal and treaty rights are not adequately considered nor protected within the 
current regulatory system (Laidlaw 2016a). Carla Davidson, a government affairs consultant 
based in southern Alberta, explained,  
Right now, the assumption has been very explicitly stated that the protection of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights is a natural extension of protection of the environment. And 
that because they are protecting the environment, then, ‘I don’t know why you’re 
concerned.’ And that’s essentially what we hear. And when we say, ‘You need to actually 
consider how we protect Aboriginal and treaty rights,’ there is honest confusion from the 
technical people in the government; ‘How would you ever do that?’ They ask. [I-09, 10 
August 2017] 
 
A recurring theme in the engagement sessions and interviews in which I partook was the 
widespread lack of proficiency in evaluating Indigenous rights and issues among decision-
makers in Alberta. These discussions complement growing evidence of cultural 
misrepresentation and deficient expertise in assessing impacts to rights. This trend is documented 
in traditional land use (TLU) studies (Baker and Westman 2018; Natcher 2001; Westman 2013), 
which constitute a primary means of consultation (Baker 2016), as well as in regulatory disputes 
and hearings (McCormack 2016). Across the board, Joly and Westman (2017: 5) reaffirm, 
proficiency in evaluating social- and rights-based issues is widely lacking in oil sands 
governance.  
Energy governance processes in Alberta offer primacy to economic and fiscal growth 
(Adkin 2016), although a number of studies assert this is contrary to public opinion (see Dyer 
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2007; Rudny 2015). As oil sands extraction was steadily increasing in pace a decade ago, the 
Pembina Institute found that over 70% of Albertans surveyed believed the Government of 
Alberta should suspend new oil sands approvals until environmental and infrastructural issues 
had been addressed (Dyer 2007: 3). The majority of Albertans expressed concern that oil sands 
extraction had been occurring too quickly (Dyer 2007: 4), and Albertans commonly feel that 
more environmental oversight is needed (Rudny 2015). As such, it appears that the AER’s notion 
of the public interest does not incorporate the needs of Indigenous peoples, nor reflect the actual 
preferences of Albertans at large. 
3.4 Reforming the System: The Proliferation of Opportunities for Engagement 
At engagement sessions with the AER, government representatives often attempted to create a 
marked divide between themselves and past regulatory bodies such as the ERCB, saying, “We 
are not the same regulator, we are not. We are trying to do business in a different way” 
(Fieldnotes 5 May 2017). The province is cognizant of the lack of faith in its regulatory system. 
In recent years, in an attempt to combat its negative reputation, Alberta’s regulatory process has 
undergone significant reforms (Hoberg and Phillips 2011). The AER was created in 2013, 
amalgamating regulatory functions previously housed by Alberta Environment and Sustainable 
Resource Development since 2008, and the Alberta Energy Utilities Board before that. Spurred 
in large part by mounting, global criticism over the opacity and weakness of the previous 
structure (Ellis 2016; International Energy Agency 2010), the reforms aimed to add transparency 
and streamline Alberta’s regulatory process.12 Yet these changes left a single regulatory body 
with all decisions related to both industrial extraction and environment, while fully funded by 
industry, raising further concerns (Pratt 2013).13  
Alongside this restructuring, Alberta’s energy sector has seen a proliferation of advisory 
committees, outreach, and engagement initiatives (Hoberg and Phillips 2011). To name but a 
sample, this includes the Oil Sands Advisory Group (OSAG); the Tailings Management 
Framework’s Stakeholder Interest Group (SIG); the Indigenous Wisdom Advisory Panel to the                                                         
12 While fostering a reputation of regulator transparency was a major impetus for the reforms, critics 
express concern that the AER’s new chairperson, Gerry Protti, is the former founding President of the 
Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers, and allegedly possesses “a bias in favour of the oil 
industry” (National Farmers Union 2013). This is another example of regulatory capture via the revolving 
door. 
13 One of the more vocal critics was then-Environment Critic Rachel Notley, for the New Democratic 
Party, who argued the reforms could “decimate” Alberta’s ability to protect the environment (Pratt 2013). 
The new structure has since held, despite Notley’s election as Alberta Premier in 2015. 
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Alberta Environmental Monitoring, Evaluation, and Reporting Agency (AEMERA); working 
groups on the AER’s Liability Management programs (e.g., the Mine Financial Security 
Program) as well as the AER’s Integrated Decision-making Approach (IDA); joint provincial 
and federal engagement sessions on Oil Sands Monitoring (replacing the Joint Oil Sands 
Monitoring Program [JOSM], from which First Nations withdrew due to concerns over 
transparency); and WBNP’s Cooperative Management Committee (CMC). These multifarious 
participatory processes bring together representatives from government bodies and First Nations 
and Métis groups, occasionally incorporating private firms as well.14 The sessions I attended 
were typically held in hotel conference rooms and government offices in Edmonton, Calgary, 
and Fort McMurray (Figure 3.3), thus requiring significant time and capacity to participate.  
 
 
Alberta Environment and Parks, in conjunction with Environment and Climate Change 
Canada, held the first engagement session I attended. I left the bright conference room in Fort 
McMurray’s Radisson Hotel taken aback by the antagonistic conversations. In between light-
hearted coffee breaks and catered lunches, First Nations and Métis representation raised                                                         
14 Although proponents have established their own closed collaborative forum, Canada’s Oil Sands 
Innovation Alliance (COSIA), in which ten major companies share “experience and intellectual property” 
with the stated aim of improving environmental performance (COSIA n.d.), associate members are 
limited to industry actors, research hubs, and academic institutions. Indigenous communities emphasized 
during engagement sessions with government that they are not privy to these conversations. 
Figure 3.3. Mikisew presents a video at an engagement session with the federal 
government at the Best Western hotel in Fort McMurray. (Photo by author, 19 July 2017) 
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fundamental concerns about government departments’ abilities and readiness to incorporate 
Aboriginal and treaty rights into plans and policies. I slowly became accustomed to the 
combative atmosphere of these sessions, with various GIRs’ and IRCs’ frustrations palpable and 
enduring, as pressing questions on consultation and engagement processes went unanswered. 
Expectations for participation have evolved remarkably in recent years, a fact noted by 
the AER’s CEO, Jim Ellis (2016). Informants spoke to this burst of participatory processes in a 
variety of ways. Lawyer Mark Gustafson tied the trend to “an explosion of rhetoric change” (I-
04, 25 July 2017) around climate change, UNDRIP, and reconciliation at the last provincial 
election (e.g., Morin 2015). In 2015, Alberta’s New Democratic Party (NDP) won an election 
that brought a left-of-centre party to power in the province for the first time since the 1930s 
(Mills 2017). While also exhibiting scepticism regarding the authenticity of these election 
promises and linguistic devices, which is shared by a number of scholars (Carter, Fraser, and 
Zalik 2017; Mills 2017), the aforementioned informant argued that the accompanying rhetoric 
change stimulates conversations on energy governance on a broader scale. The rhetoric change is 
also apparent, though perhaps to a lesser degree, at the national level. A federal Crown 
Consultation Coordinator reflected on Albertan and Canadian government authorities as being 
increasingly open to such dialogue: “Whereas before perhaps there would have been a role for 
government as a regulator that, you know, would have put up more conservative barriers, I think 
that is changing” (I-03, 22 July 2017). The latter respondent asserted that governments are 
opening up to the idea of steady collaboration and informational exchange with Indigenous 
peoples. In my interviews, respondents from government (two) and industry (one) acknowledged 
the importance of added avenues for community input – though perceptions of these processes’ 
implementation vary widely (Mills 2017). Indeed, Carter, Fraser, and Zalik (2017) note that the 
NDP election does not seem to have resulted in regulatory reform, positing that this is due to the 
centrality of fossil fuel extraction to the province’s revenue base. 
3.4.1 Policymaking as a “black box”: The ongoing negation of Indigenous voices 
Participatory processes have proliferated in Alberta in recent years (Hoberg and Phillips 
2011), yet respondents and acquaintances I interacted with in the field consistently put their 
effectiveness into question. One informant characterized Alberta’s regulatory reform from 2012 
to 2014 in the following manner:  
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[It is] a lot of restructuring to make it harder for First Nations to participate in energy 
decisions… Harder to participate in hearings, different scope of hearings to limit the 
effectiveness – the already limited effectiveness – of consultation, and turning 
consultation into full-on opportunity just to blow off steam, not to actually influence 
decisions. [I-04, 25 July 2017] 
 
As is becoming increasingly apparent in other energy governance contexts (e.g., Dokis 2015), 
despite participatory reforms, First Nations and Métis representatives in the oil sands region 
continue to express frustration at the government’s approach to engagement (Joly and Westman 
2017). These representatives regularly discuss the governance of energy extraction as a “black 
box,”15 comparing Alberta’s regulatory process to aircraft devices with unknown internal 
mechanisms; they are poorly understood yet they produce specific, critical results (Cambridge 
Dictionary n.d.). Following an engagement session with the Alberta Energy Regulator, a Fort 
McMurray First Nation staff member rebuked, “They encourage us to offer input, with no 
promise that it will be incorporated or even taken seriously” (Fieldnotes 28 June 2017). As 
Hoberg and Phillips (2011) concluded in an early analysis of Alberta’s bourgeoning multi-
stakeholder initiatives, while First Nations and Métis peoples are invited to an increasing number 
of engagement sessions, most critical decisions seem to be made in opaque, closed forums.16 As 
such, ongoing practices defy the recommendations of the AER-funded Best-in-Class Regulator 
Initiative, which consistently found that stakeholders and rights-holders are not nearly as 
interested in being privy to data, so much as grasping the rationale underlying major decisions 
(Coglianese 2015).  
Consultation and regulatory specialists described participation-oriented reforms as a 
mechanism to keep Indigenous representatives running in circles. This aligns with Hoberg and 
Phillips’ (2011) assertion that multi-stakeholder forums can also serve as a form of co-optation 
or manipulation (510). One Dene expert in consultation explained,  
It’s a shellgame of redirecting you to all these multiple processes without any 
accountability in the system, because it is designed to keep you moving to address issues 
in all these different arenas, where there is literally a strategic approach to not addressing 
impacts to Aboriginal and treaty rights. [I-08, 6 August 2017] 
                                                         
15 The same language appears in reporting and media coverage (e.g., Thurton 2017). 
16 Moreover, often government departments and proponents request community participation and input 
without providing adequate capacity funding for the technical reviews of policies and regulations. As 
such, communities are not equally equipped to partake in such governance negotiations (Joly and 
Westman 2017). 
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Indigenous voices continue to be marginalized in a regulatory system that seems largely unable 
and unwilling to address concerns that are raised, especially as they pertain to Aboriginal and 
treaty rights (Joly and Westman 2017; McCormack 2016).  
Alberta’s reforms constitute a strategy of containment (Pralle 2006), or a defensive tactic 
that maintains state primacy in policymaking (Hoberg and Phillips 2011). A technical consultant 
elucidated this in discussing a recent experience in which the issues she raised regarding 
Aboriginal and treaty rights were deemed out-of-scope at the Stakeholder Interest Group – a 
table specifically designed for out-of-scope issues. Reflecting on the incident, she pressed,  
I think what the government is doing is really terrible, and I do think that it’s a concerted 
effort to be as dismissive as possible towards Indigenous rights. […] No one actually 
expects that anything is going to change, from going to these stupid multi-stakeholder 
tables. Nothing. [I-09, 10 August 2017] 
 
First Nations are given many opportunities to offer input without knowing whether their voices 
will be heard, much less acted upon, beyond the walls of the conference rooms in which they 
meet – much like Dokis (2015) documents in the Northwest Territories. As I experienced 
firsthand while working with Mikisew, Indigenous peoples in the oil sands are constantly 
fielding calls to attend such sessions. Yet they leave feeling dismayed as Indigenous concerns 
and rights are sidelined, or “put in a parking lot,” as government officials regularly say in 
meetings. It is common for communities to walk out of such sessions early, after getting their 
concerns on record for potential future legal challenges against Alberta. This is a testament to 
persistent reservations about these forums. Despite participation-based attempts to enhance the 
legitimacy of governance in Alberta, the regulatory system continues to undermine the protection 
of Aboriginal and treaty rights. 
Reforms to energy governance have been undertaken as an attempt to remedy a 
widespread lack of public confidence in the decision-making process. Yet as a Dene consultation 
veteran admonished, “There is still as much obstruction to addressing key issues as there was 
historically” (I-08, 6 August 2017). Fundamental flaws in Alberta’s energy governance 
mechanisms remain. Governments continue to delegate the duty to consult to industry (Newman 
2009), although proponents can only attend to project-specific impacts (Laidlaw 2016a). This 
leaves no space for consultation on cumulative impacts and landscape-scale planning (Carter, 
Fraser, and Zalik 2017). As a result, while rights holders recognize themselves as essential 
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partners in decision-making processes, they persistently feel disregarded and silenced (FG-06, 21 
August 2017; also see Mills 2017).  
3.5 Case Study: The Regulatory Treatment of Tailings 
Informants pinpoint reclamation and tailings as an example of ongoing black box-style 
regulatory decision-making (Fieldnotes 31 May 2017). Tailings ponds, which are central to 
debates on reclamation, are designed to contain oil sands process-affected water. Historian 
Chastko (2004) emphasizes that fluid tailings have been mismanaged since the emergence of oil 
sands mining in the mid-twentieth century, with industry steering regulations and policies 
designed to oversee their activities. The sheer magnitude of reclamation planning renders 
imperative the need for binding regulations and community-informed solutions. Currently, 
decisions are made behind closed doors while veiled in rhetoric of public interest and the greater 
good. 
Tailings ponds are supposed to be a temporary solution to the industry’s waste problems 
(Hutchins 2014). Tailings pose a number of environmental threats (NEB 2014), such as the 
around-the-clock groundwater-based diffusion of pollutants, some of which are carcinogenic and 
have deleterious effects (McNeill and Lothian 2017). According to the Pembina Institute, by 
2015, fluid tailings totalled 1.18 trillion litres (McNeill and Lothian 2017). Cognizant of the 
colossal potential impact of these tailings, in recent years, Mikisew and other downstream 
Indigenous groups have expended much energy engaging with government and non-profit 
organizations and think tanks to improve tailings management.  
Policies and regulatory frameworks meant to direct industry’s application of tailings 
ponds as a waste management solution have proven malleable. Initially, the AER outlined 
tailings performance criteria in Directive 074 (2009), but 074 was scrapped after corporate firms 
protested its stringent standards as unfeasible, for they required tailings volumes to be reduced 
and landscape reclamation to occur within 5 years of mine closure. No oil sands operators met 
their own plans and guidelines under Directive 074. Directive 085 has since replaced 074 (AER 
2015a). My participation in working groups and multi-stakeholder forums on 085 brought to 
light intense criticism from Indigenous peoples, NGOs, and other interested parties. Primary 
concerns include the new directive’s disregard for Indigenous rights and cumulative effects. The 
new regulatory framework is guided by companies’ ability to comply, opponents assert – this is a 
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trait Kirsch (2014: 48) characterizes as a staple of neoliberal economic policy. Opportunities for 
public input have been highly limited.  
Private firms have developed tailings management plans aiming to comply with Directive 
085 and the accompanying Tailings Management Framework for Mineable Athabasca Oil Sands 
(TMF) (AER 2015b). These plans were due in fall 2016. Suncor’s plan was the first to be 
reviewed, and the AER publicly informed Suncor that its plan did not adequately fulfill the 
requirements of either the TMF or Directive 085 (AER 2017b). The plan was rejected due to 
insufficient information and untimeliness, as well as its reliance upon unproven technologies 
(CBC News 2017a). Yet after outcry from Suncor, the AER reconsidered, and ultimately 
accepted the plan with minimal changes (CBC News 2017b). Other plans that directly 
contravene Directive 085 have been passed since (Pembina Institute 2017). Tailings management 
typifies regulatory capture in the oil sands, as industrial actors have repeatedly swayed 
governmental bodies to whittle down regulatory requirements.  
We are witnessing the “gross historical mismanagement” of tailings today, according to a 
technical expert I interviewed following an engagement session on the financial costs of 
reclamation (I-09, 10 August 2017). The respondent, Carla Davidson, consults regularly for the 
Wood Buffalo Environmental Association (WBEA) and Fort McKay First Nation, and has 
previously worked with the Canadian Oil Sands Innovation Alliance (COSIA). Davidson 
elaborated,  
All these tailings management plans are very vague […]; these reclamation plans are very 
fluid. So even now, there’s no way to tell what the final landform is going to look like. 
The really scary thing for me is that the government legitimately has not even considered 
doing […] a cumulative effects assessment of all of these reclamation plans. [I-09, 10 
August 2017]  
As Davidson underscores, the AER does not intend to undertake a cumulative assessment of the 
effects of tailings plans, allowing industry to take the lead in proposing and implementing novel 
strategies for managing process-affected water. As Carter, Fraser, and Zalik (2017: 74-75) 
reaffirm, the avoidance of cumulative effects assessments is typical of neoliberal regimes. Under 
industry’s hegemony (Stewart 2017), there are no viable or tangible long-term solutions that 
have been set forth to manage northern Alberta’s extractive zones.  
Reclamation in the oil sands was a central concern articulated by the vast majority of my 
informants. During my interviews, various Consultation Coordinators for Mikisew and Fort 
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McKay First Nations reaffirmed that their communities’ preferences regarding end land use have 
been neglected. Expressing concern over what would be left of Mikisew’s traditional lands in the 
wake of extraction, a Band Council Member reflected, 
I think that one day it’s going to just exhaust our treaty and cultural and Aboriginal 
rights, because industry will take over our land, and they say they’re going to reclaim it 
and stuff like that, but who really lays down a seed better than the Creator? Bends the 
rivers like he’s done, or raised a tree up, you know? [I-06, 29 July 2017] 
 
This perspective illustrates the stark contrast between the views of Indigenous peoples and those 
of industry in planning for reclamation.  
As Joly (2017) underscores, these reclamation plans are incompatible with traditional 
land uses, despite industry assertions to the contrary. Joly (2017) adds that reclamation rhetoric, 
which emphasizes utility, trivializes Indigenous relations to the land. Reclamation planning and 
ongoing tailings management in Alberta fails to incorporate the views and priorities of 
Indigenous peoples and NGOs.  
Jodi McNeill, a Calgary-based Policy Analyst, elaborated,  
It makes me nervous that there are so many unknowns and there really aren’t […] the 
resources to be able to address those unknowns after the oil and the dollars have come out 
of the ground. That really does make me nervous. [I-10, 13 August 2017] 
 
Indeed, environmental watchdogs warn that the potential taxpayer liability of the tailings ponds 
now surpasses the total royalties obtained by Alberta over the past fifty years of extraction 
(Environmental Defence Canada 2017). Private firms’ reclamation plans may require permanent 
maintenance and monitoring (McNeill and Lothian 2017). The vast societal costs of 
environmental contaminants and clean-up liabilities in post-extractive terrains render the (mis-) 
management of reclamation entirely contradictory to the public interest (Slowey and Stefanick 
2015). 
The AER’s inability to address the oil sands’ tailings legacy undermines the agency’s 
attempts at combating its reputation as a captured regulator. Tailings’ treatment to date reaffirms 
assertions that the regulator is inclined to comply with industry’s needs, placing corporate 
interests above those of Indigenous peoples, key stakeholders, and the public at large. The 
regulatory system is sanctioning leakages and mismanagement of toxic fluid tailings in the oil 
sands. 
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3.6 Conclusion 
Much as Richards and Pratt forecasted in 1979, energy extraction is of critical importance to 
Alberta’s political and economic organization (Carter and Zalik 2016). The devolution of 
responsibilities from state to corporate institutions emerges as a defining feature when assessing 
energy governance. Cultural capture provides a critical basis for assessing energy governance in 
the oil sands, given the emergence of an epistemic community that oversees and manages 
extraction in northern Alberta, and relatedly, the pre-eminence of the revolving door 
phenomenon. My findings suggest that the majority of individuals within my convenience 
sample had worked for various sectors of energy governance (e.g., industry, government, and 
Indigenous communities). Individuals with experience in regulatory and consultation work 
frequently move between positions in these sectors’ offices. Within a captured political system, 
the public interest is easily subsumed to economic and private interests. Decision-makers grant 
fiscal solvency pre-eminence within the public interest, and thus sideline Indigenous rights and 
broader societal priorities, although recent Canadian jurisprudence may add to the imperative to 
address this regulatory shortcoming. 
In response to global concern over Alberta’s regulatory deficiencies, the provincial 
government recently restructured the Alberta Energy Regulator and established a range of 
participatory processes. Yet as my ethnographic research suggests, despite the Alberta Energy 
Regulator’s efforts to become a “Best-in-Class” regulator (Coglianese 2015), outstanding issues 
plague the oversight of the oil sands. Indications of capture persist in Alberta. This is apparent in 
the ongoing mismanagement of tailings ponds and reclamation, wherein regulatory bodies 
disregard the burgeoning legacy of energy extraction. In spite of reforms, the regulatory system 
is fragmentary (Carter, Fraser, and Zalik 2017). Alberta’s regulatory framework appears ill 
equipped to address Indigenous rights and other fundamental concerns tied to oil sands 
extraction, thus sidelining critical points of public interest. Deep-seated regulatory shortcomings 
in Alberta, and the social and political conditions that contribute to these trends, warrant further 
civic attention.   
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Chapter Four: Mikisew’s Mobilization in the Oil Sands Region 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Sitting in the ceremonial grounds at the heart of Fort Chipewyan (Figure 4.1), an informant 
explained, “We want to be able to retain the opportunities for our culture into the future, and for 
our rights into the future” (I-08, 6 August 2017). She maintained that Indigenous groups in the 
region are profoundly united in prioritizing the ability to practice their culture and rights. Her 
family was from another First Nation in the region, and she had been working in Indigenous 
relations and consultation on behalf of both industry and First Nations in the region over the past 
15 years. Priorities and traditions may differ significantly. Yet ultimately, protecting Indigenous 
rights and practices is the utmost priority, prompting the execution of increasingly complex 
mobilization tactics, a term that I use to refer to a range of strategic responses pursued by 
Indigenous peoples to resist and/or negotiate industrial expansion in the oil sands region. 
In northern Alberta, Indigenous peoples have mobilized in a variety of ways to promote 
Aboriginal and treaty rights and to enhance self-determination over their lands, as political 
scientist Slowey (2008) suggests of the Mikisew Cree at the turn of the new millennium. As 
Wanvik and Caine (2017) (geographer and sociologist, respectively) set forth, Indigenous 
peoples are strategically and pragmatically engaged in energy governance forums. The Mikisew 
Cree actively assert their inherent rights to govern their traditional lands, in accordance with 
Figure 4.1: The residents of Fort Chipewyan celebrate Treaty Days on the ceremonial grounds at 
Doghead Arbour, where a residential school once stood. (Photo by author, 22 June 2017) 
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Treaty 8 (1899), Section 35 of the Canadian Constitution (1982), and the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007). This chapter explores the evolution of 
Mikisew’s mobilization in the oil sands region through (1) their employment of diverse 
strategies, and (2) their representation in the epistemic communities (Haas 1992) overseeing 
energy governance in the oil sands. Contributing to my investigation of the evolution of energy 
governance in northern Alberta, this chapter highlights the strategies and processes by which 
Indigenous communities and their staff are attempting to disrupt traditionally closed spheres of 
energy governance in Alberta through political mobilization. 
The Mikisew Cree and other nearby communities have been strategically resisting and 
negotiating extraction for decades (Longley 2015); they are not passive recipients, but active 
agents that are “navigating neoliberalism” (Slowey 2008) by negotiating industrial presence 
(Angell and Parkins 2011). My ethnographic data suggests that the primary avenues of 
mobilization pursued by the MCFN are: government consultation, industry negotiations, 
litigation, and advocacy.17 I attend to these changing strategies for negotiating energy extraction. 
This chapter pays particular attention to the lived experiences of staff working in consultation 
offices such as the GIR, which are representative hubs that engage on behalf of First Nations and 
Métis communities. 
4.2 Emergent Indigenous Mobilization Strategies: Local Use and Perceptions 
Strategies for enhancing self-determination are complex and dynamic (Slowey and Stefanick 
2015). While past research on energy governance and mobilization patterns is informative, local 
accounts and perspectives on these mobilization tendencies have seldom been explicitly 
addressed (but see Gerbrandt 2015; Joly 2017; Wanvik and Caine 2017). This chapter responds 
to the need to study the strategies and motivations underlying the mobilization of Indigenous 
groups, as noted by environmental anthropologists Joly and Westman (2017: 27-29). My time in 
the field reinforced two key ideas regarding Mikisew’s mobilization. First, these strategies are 
highly situational and context-dependent. Strategies vary widely depending on extant capabilities 
and conditions. Second, as an Indigenous manager at the GIR stated, “Without one of these                                                         
17 ‘Advocacy’ refers to outreach and education activities targeting decision-makers, external parties (e.g., 
NGOs), or the broader public on the impacts of extractive activities and related legislation and regulations 
in the oil sands region. This verges into the realm of lobbying as well, as communities ally or work 
unilaterally to call for action on legislation or regulations. For the sake of simplicity, unless informants 
specifically use the term lobbying, advocacy will be employed to refer to this direct action-based work. 
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[strategies], none of [the others] are really helpful” (FG-06, 21 August 2017). That is, these 
strategies are best operationalized in tandem, and are far from mutually exclusive. Jodi McNeill, 
a Policy Analyst at the Pembina Institute, noted that government consultation and advocacy 
work, for instance, are thoroughly interlinked (I-13, 13 August 2017). The GIR Director added to 
this sentiment, saying, “They can all be really equal […] It all kind of plays into each other” 
(FG-01, 21 August 2017). Lacking the ability to say no to development, Indigenous peoples 
engage on many fronts to enhance their control and outcomes regarding extraction in the region.  
            
Previous research does not commonly explore the rationale underlying Indigenous 
mobilization strategies (litigation, government consultation, industry negotiations, and advocacy) 
(Wanvik and Caine 2017: 596). Figure 4.2 (above) depicts the results of a simplified pile sorting 
activity (J. J. Smith 1993; J. J. Smith and Borgatti 1997) that I conducted while completing 
interviews and a focus group in northern Alberta. My informants were individuals engaged in 
energy governance on behalf of government, industry, and Indigenous communities, as well as 
Mikisew members. While this pile sorting exercise should be repeated with a larger group of 
respondents in the future research to enhance its reliability, I will discuss my preliminary 
findings here. My informants perceive litigation (i.e., court injunctions, constitutional challenges, 
Figure 4.2. Informants’ perceptions of the relative value of Indigenous mobilization strategies.  
This chart depicts the views of participants (n=17) regarding the most and least valuable means 
of mobilizing to protect Indigenous rights and interests that are regularly employed in the oil 
sands region. 
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and other means of operationalizing legal knowledge) to be the most valuable means of 
mobilizing to advance and protect Mikisew’s rights. Perceptions of the utility of government 
consultation and industry negotiations are highly mixed and uneven. Advocacy is widely 
perceived among my informants to be of low utility. The following sub-sections expand upon 
these findings, contextualizing them with primary and secondary material. A note of caution is 
merited here; this preliminary investigation would benefit from further expansion due to the 
small sample size I have obtained (see Chapter Five), and the biases exhibited among 
respondents in favour of their own professional orientation. 
4.2.1 Litigation: Advancing the duty to consult in the oil sands region 
Eight of my informants18 recognized litigation as the most valuable strategy (Figure 4.2). 
“We wouldn’t be here without Supreme Court decisions,” Mikisew’s GIR Director asserted (FG-
01, 21 August 2017). Litigation has resulted in two primary outcomes: Litigation has (1) 
advanced case law on the duty to consult, thus entrenching consultation as a central feature in oil 
sands governance (Laidlaw 2016b; Newman 2014b); and (2) led to the emergence of other state-
community governance arrangements.  
Representatives of the Mikisew Cree First Nation agreed that litigation is the most 
influential means of mobilization at their disposal:  
It really is what is driving everything. It presents the greatest risk to industry and 
government, and when you present the greatest risk to their development, you get their 
attention. You get that seat at the table. [FG-06, 21 August 2017] 
  
Indeed, historically, litigation has been a critical means of enhancing environmental oversight 
and consultation (Joly and Westman 2017; Longley 2015). The GIR’s Government Relations 
Manager explained that going to court enables First Nations to “raise the bar” in governmental 
processes (FG-03, 21 August 2017). That is, they strengthen the interpretation, and therefore the 
application, of the duty to consult. The Crown’s fiduciary duty to consult, which stems from 
constitutionally protected treaty and Aboriginal rights, incites state engagement with Indigenous 
peoples (Asch 2014; Newman 2014a). A Dene Regulatory Manager that has collaborated                                                         
18 The eight respondents were: Two Government Relations Coordinators (GIR Manager and Consultant), 
two Regulatory Coordinators, one Lawyer, one ENGO representative, one Member of Parliament (who is 
also a lawyer), and the GIR’s Director. If the two who have practiced law were removed from the sample, 
litigation would remain the most popular response, though its relative significance would decline slightly. 
This tendency points to the need to engage in broader sampling to account for professional biases among 
respondents. 
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extensively with the GIR explained the necessity of litigation in the region by saying, “If 
government was actually doing what it’s supposed to be doing – and they should be, they’re the 
managers, they should be on top – we shouldn’t have to force them legally” (FG-08, 6 August 
2017). During my fieldwork, many informants bemoaned current tendencies to pursue legal 
challenges, arguing that litigation should constitute a last resort. At the same time, this diverse 
group of respondents – which included industry, government, and community representatives – 
also acknowledged litigation as a crucial strategy. 
4.2.2 Government consultation & negotiation with industry 
State-led consultation and review processes are cemented through legislation and 
Canadian jurisprudence. The state integrates the bulk of its Aboriginal consultation 
responsibilities within Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (EIA and SIA, 
respectively), which serve primarily to assess the potential environmental impacts of energy 
development. Some see these state-led consultation and review processes as a promising opening 
for social and institutional change (e.g., Bonds 2007). Yet as Crowley (2016) demonstrates in the 
case of the Joslyn North Mine, EIAs tend to downplay uncertainties, and the public hearing 
process does not provide sufficient space to debate ambiguities and risks related to individual 
projects and cumulative effects. The validity and reliability of these consultative regimes have 
been put into question (Baker and Westman 2018; O’Faircheallaigh 2007).  
Within my sample, the only respondents who labelled government consultation as the 
most valuable means of mobilization were either officials or contractors hired by the federal 
government (two), or Mikisew councillors and members (two). Unlike the majority, these 
informants are hopeful that government is changing its tune, and “finally paying attention” to 
Indigenous voices, a Manager at the GIR reflected (FG-06, 21 August 2017). These findings 
highlight the need to amass a broader sample, in order to account for biases based on 
professional expertise. However, this tendency also speaks to the lack of faith in state-led 
processes documented elsewhere (e.g., Baker and Westman 2018).  
Consultation processes are meant to correct power imbalances between communities and 
the state (Ritchie 2013: 400). Yet ethnographic research reinforces that the consultation process 
is “not working” for these First Nations, as Gerbrandt (2015: 7) notes of WCFN, whose members 
found their concerns (e.g., lingering smell of crude oil, emissions, respiratory difficulties) went 
unacknowledged by government and industry representatives. Ritchie (2013) highlights that 
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meaningful consultation is not guaranteed; the state is not obliged to fund First Nations to 
participate effectively, nor to reach agreements with communities (400).19 As a result, CEMA 
President and GIR Industry Relations Manager Dan Stuckless asserted, “Government looks at 
[consultation] as a box to check” (FG-02, 21 August 2017), emphasizing that it has yet to 
become a responsive, two-way dialogue. Thus, consultation and regulatory processes sideline 
Indigenous concerns and rights.  
The ongoing evolution of consultation standards through Canadian jurisprudence has also 
led to the emergence of state-community arrangements. For instance, Mikisew levelled a legal 
challenge against Canada’s 2012 omnibus overhaul of environmental legislation (Courtoreille v. 
Canada [Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development] 2014; Coyle 2016; Slowey and 
Stefanick 2015). While this case has recently gone to the Supreme Court of Canada for decision 
(Weber 2018a), the legal action has also resulted in the signing of a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) between Canada’s Department of Justice and MCFN. This allows 
Mikisew to engage directly with various federal departments regarding the impacts of legislative 
proposals to their Aboriginal and treaty rights. MOUs have also been pursued between First 
Nations and the Alberta government to ensure consultation is undertaken in policymaking (M. 
Ross 2003). However these initiatives may not constitute cooperative management, as there is no 
actual power-sharing of decision-making (M. Ross 2003: 18). Indeed, First Nations’ and Métis’ 
representatives note in meetings that “MOUs have not worked in the past;” they fail to bind 
governments to their commitments, and lack enforceability (Meeting notes 7 June 2017; also see 
Zalik 2016).  
When I inquired about government consultation in an interview with Member of 
Parliament Linda Duncan, she aptly responded, “Government consultation nowadays is industry 
consultation, right?” (I-07, 2 August 2017). Many informants reaffirmed that governance has 
shifted in the past couple of decades, as the government has devolved much of its regulatory and 
fiduciary consultation responsibilities to private firms (Gogal, Riegert, and Jamieson 2005; 
Jenkins 2004; Wanvik 2016). Wanvik (2016) refers to this trend as the emergence of 
“governance as corporate stakeholder management” in Alberta (519).                                                          
19 In Haida (2004), the Supreme Court held that “The Crown is not under a duty to reach an agreement; 
rather, the commitment is to a meaningful process of consultation in good faith.” This ruling clarifies that 
provincial and federal governments ultimately have the power to make decisions on land and resource use 
after consulting with Indigenous communities. 
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Industry-community negotiations may result in impact benefit agreements (IBAs) 
(O’Faircheallaigh 2007). Speaking to these agreements, a Regulatory Coordinator at the GIR 
discussed the tensions at play: 
Nobody’s going to say no to the money, but at the same time, [MCFN] would be happy 
not to have it and just be able to go out on the land undisturbed, and to be able to hunt 
and fish and trap undisturbed. [I-05, 28 July 2018]  
 
The coordinator felt that Mikisew is caught in a bind. MCFN does not have the ability to 
withhold consent for upcoming projects. Therefore it is left to negotiate to reap tangible benefits 
and leverage opportunities to enhance infrastructure. IBAs can offer financial capital, capacity 
building, and business and employment opportunities (Gogal, Riegert, and Jamieson 2005. A 
Cree GIR Manager asserted that today, these direct negotiations are “actually more 
comprehensive than a consultation process” (FG-06, 21 August 2017). One informant at the fore 
of negotiating such agreements added that IBAs have grown much more rigorous since 2010; 
beforehand, he noted, they had “no real money to them,” and had since become increasingly long 
term and binding (I-04, 25 July 2017). Today, these IBAs can bring in tens or hundreds of 
millions of dollars for each Indigenous group that will be demonstrably impacted by an 
impending oil sands project. IBAs’ financial values vary widely depending on a range of factors 
that includes the project’s size and proximity, projected impacts, and more. These agreements are 
usually not public knowledge. 
Bilateral (industry-community) negotiations can be considered mutually beneficial. On 
the one hand, private firms are willing to engage in direct negotiations in order to protect their 
social license to operate (Gibson and O’Faircheallaigh 2010; Trebeck 2008). The law does not 
require such negotiations; they are pursued to combat investor uncertainty (Zalik 2016). To this 
end, IBAs commonly possess clauses barring First Nations and Métis signatories from stating 
direct opposition to a given project in the regulatory process. On the other hand, these 
negotiations enable signatories to share in the economic activity that is occurring 
(O’Faircheallaigh 2017). Shelley Larose, a Community and Indigenous Relations Representative 
with Imperial Oil, emphasized, “there’s lots of opportunity for collaboration in this space” (I-11, 
16 August 2017). Larose explained that Imperial’s outreach work and engagement with Mikisew 
has fostered personal relationships and ultimately spurred many “community investments” (I-11, 
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16 August 2017). For instance, Imperial has funded literacy programs and outfitted Fort 
Chipewyan’s schools’ science and computer labs with modern technology. 
Beyond corporate responsibility strategies and IBAs, significant revenue-sharing 
arrangements are also being explored. One such example is the recent joint acquisition of 49% 
interest of a Suncor Energy storage facility between Fort McKay First Nation and the Mikisew 
Cree First Nation, which constitutes a long-term revenue-sharing agreement with Suncor, a 
major oil sands developer (Bird 2017). Leaders say revenue from the deal, with a projected value 
of over half a billion dollars, will be used to fund programming such as Fort Chipewyan’s Elders 
Care Centre (Bird 2017). As the Imperial Oil representative underscored, “Industry has things it 
can put on the table, where government has been fairly reluctant, at least in this region, to put 
anything on the table” (I-11, 16 August 2017).20 This reasoning was shared among those who 
granted primacy to mobilization through industry negotiations; although their current positions 
differed, all four of these respondents had at some point in the past worked for industry or for 
Fort McKay First Nation, whose Sustainability Department arguably prioritizes the provision of 
socioeconomic benefits for its members (I-05, 28 July 2017). Direct negotiations with industry 
address project-specific concerns, my interviewees emphasized. “Government never consults 
anyone,” suggested M.P. Linda Duncan; in actuality, it is project proponents who consult (I-07, 2 
August 2017).  
Mikisew’s GIR staff recognized engagement with project proponents as a critical process. 
If industry funding were to run out, according to Mikisew leadership, the GIR would put all other 
forms of mobilization on hold. The GIR Director explained, “We would be so focused on trying 
to meet with industry to secure funding, and negotiating with them!” (FG-01, 21 August 2017). 
The GIR representatives in my focus group unanimously agreed that industry negotiations are a 
prerequisite for all of their work. Agreements with private firms provide critical funding to 
consultation offices (Urquhart 2010; Zalik 2016): The offices leverage industry dollars to hire 
regulatory and consultation experts, and thus foster organizational advancement, capacity, and 
expertise (Wanvik and Caine 2017). Evidently structural reliance upon industry financing is not 
only exhibited by the state. Community dependence upon the financial benefits accrued from 
industry negotiations is a point of concern (elsewhere noted by Parlee 2015; Zalik 2016). The                                                         20 Yet Slowey’s (2008) research on Mikisew’s TLE may indicate that this trend is not absolute. 
Moreover, securing substantial agreements with the federal government may empower First Nations in 
the area to better navigate neoliberalism. 
 56 
GIR office relies upon industry dollars for survival, and then uses this support to combat the 
impacts of the very same institutions that fund them. 
The redistribution of state responsibilities to non-state actors such as private firms 
(Berkes 2010) characterizes energy governance in Alberta. Slowey (2008: 15-16) suggests that 
by participating in the resulting neoliberal structures, MCFN may enhance its self-determination. 
However, corporate social responsibility practices (CSR) are unreliable in their assessment of 
social and environmental concerns (Jenkins and Yakovleva 2006), focusing more on disclosure 
and reputation than on the actual mitigation of extractive risks (Frynas 2005; Grégoire 2013). 
Concerns are mounting that collaborative arrangements with industry do not systematically 
address local needs (Hitch 2006; Taylor and Freidel 2011; Trebeck 2008; Wanvik 2016).  
A Mikisew member and leader explained,  
Negotiation with industry has not yet advanced cumulative and the more pressing issues. 
It hasn’t gotten us a health study, it hasn’t fixed LARP [Lower Athabasca Regional Plan], 
it hasn’t, you know, reached really the big fundamental issues, but it’s built the Elders 
Care Centre. It has helped in terms of giving the community some financial resources to 
help advance some of the community’s interests. [FG-01, 21 August 2017] 
 
While industry negotiations are a means of reducing or offsetting the impacts of extraction on 
Indigenous lands, as this informant suggests, evidently they do not suffice in protecting 
fundamental rights and interests. Moreover, these bilateral agreements are confidential and 
unregulated.21  
4.2.3 Advocacy 
Lack of faith in government- and industry-led processes has led Mikisew to embrace 
grassroots mobilization through direct action-based advocacy work. While advocacy can take 
many forms (such as public protests or international politicization), this strategy is pursued to 
increase public awareness and international oversight of oil sands extraction and its impacts to 
the environment and communities. The GIR’s Industry Relations Manager explained the logic 
underlying advocacy work in saying, “the reality is that some industries – and some governments 
– respond to outside influences. And I don’t think we’ve tapped into that potential yet” (FG-02,                                                         
21 In 2013, the Priority Project on Sustainable Resource Development noted that there were only two 
Impact Benefit Agreements on record in Alberta. Disclosure is not legally required in the province, 
although this may have changed under the proposed Aboriginal Consultation Levy Act (2013). The Act, 
however, was widely rejected by Indigenous communities due to lack of consultation by Alberta, and 
eventually repealed (The Canadian Press 2016). 
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21 August 2017). Fostering broad support validates local concerns, and can compel decision-
makers to incorporate Indigenous perspectives into governance processes (Chambon, Schröer, 
and Schweppe 2012).  
Advocacy and lobbying work are not widely pursued in the oil sands region. A lawyer for 
the GIR rationalized, “It’s not that many opportunities where you can really get a lot of traction 
with lobbying” (I-04, 25 July 2017). The GIR’s Government Relations Manager added, 
advocacy “comes and goes with the wind, it seems, and it’s just not something you can build on 
for long term” (FG-03, 21 August 2017). Examples of the purportedly rare use of advocacy and 
lobbying include Mikisew’s petition to UNESCO (addressed in the subsequent chapter), the Tar 
Sands Healing Walk (est. 2010) (Cardinal 2014), the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation’s 
(ACFN) advocacy work with the Indigenous Environmental Network and various public figures 
(P. Smith 2015; Urquhart 2010), including celebrities such as Leonardo DiCaprio and Neil 
Young, as well as the Lubicon Lake Nation’s successful appeals to the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee in 1990 and 2006 regarding the violation of land rights (Laboucan-Massimo 
2014). Due to the impacts of industrial activity on Lubicon’s culture and the natural 
environment, the Human Rights Committee found Canada in violation of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. However, land claim negotiations are still ongoing. 
These cases demonstrate that fruitful appeals to international publics do not necessarily translate 
into domestic solutions. 
Mikisew is inclined to engage in advocacy “[when working] through various consultation 
processes has gotten nowhere,” the First Nation’s legal counsel noted (I-04, 25 July 2017). 
Mikisew perceives grassroots organizing to be a means of increasing traction when consultation 
and regulatory avenues have failed to address Indigenous rights and concerns. Explaining the 
GIR’s motivating force, Gustafson noted,  
Oftentimes, or at least with the UNESCO petition, what I’ve seen is that there’s more 
reaction by government when there has been the lobbying component than when you’ve 
tried to get them to do something through consultation. [I-04, 25 July 2017] 
 
The relationships and networks fostered by advocacy are leveraged to raise awareness and media 
attention on the impacts of bitumen extraction in northern Alberta, which may offer profound 
possibilities to amplify Indigenous concerns. Advocacy and lobbying work can also pressure 
government and industry to uphold rights and meaningful engagement processes, as Jodi 
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McNeill of Pembina remarked (I-10, 13 August 2017). Fostering broad public support helps to 
legitimize resistance movements by increasing their visibility. The Director at the GIR reflected, 
“I think that’s how you make change – with society. And we really need society’s backing on a 
lot of the work that we do” (FG-01, 21 August 2017). As Kirsch’s (2014) work on transnational 
resistance against mining illustrates, alliances between non-profit organizations and Indigenous 
leaders can be critical when attempting to raise awareness about the impacts of industry on 
subsistence and the environment. Broader alliances appear to be especially significant when 
governments are reliant on resource rents (Kirsch 2014: 53). However, advocacy work is often 
contingent upon capacity and funding obtained through industry negotiations, informants at the 
GIR note (FG-05 and FG-06, 21 August 2017). Communities exhibit disparate inclinations and 
capabilities when considering direct action (Joly and Westman 2017: 26). The mobilization 
strategies explored above are highly situational.  
4.3 Contemporary Mobilization: Process and Variability 
4.3.1 Consultation offices: Community hubs and cultural brokers  
While in the previous section I focused on the perception of mobilization activities in Alberta 
among my informants, this section speaks to the act of asserting and actualizing local control in 
energy governance processes. I do so by attending ethnographically to the dynamics at play 
among the consultation offices and staff charged with representing Indigenous peoples such as 
MCFN. Although a number of social scientists have mentioned their involvement in the region’s 
consultation offices in capacities as researchers and consultants (e.g., Baker 2016; Joly 2017), 
little has been written about these offices, which are central in strategic mobilization in the oil 
sands region.  
Indigenous peoples’ “transformative competence” is nothing new (Wanvik and Caine 
2017: 596). Yet in the last 15 years, consultation offices in the oil sands region – and especially 
those that are most heavily impacted by bitumen extraction, such as ACFN, MCFN, and Fort 
McKay First Nation – have built an increasingly high level of capacity (Urquhart 2010; Wanvik 
2016). In the early 2000s, Mikisew leveraged financial earnings to establish the GIR and has 
since adopted “structured and process-oriented” approaches to engaging in energy governance 
(FG-03, 21 August 2017). Although, as Zalik (2016) underscores, capacity-building is enabled in 
large part by funds drawn from continued industrial presence in traditional territories. 
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Representing a community in consultation processes is a sizeable feat. The multiplicity of 
perspectives on energy extraction within Indigenous groups has long been recognized (Blaser, 
Feit, and McRae 2004). Consultation representatives must honour and communicate a diversity 
of views on oil sands extraction. In the GIR boardroom one afternoon, a non-Indigenous 
professional reflected on his role in the following manner: 
I can’t do my job unless I know who Mikisew people are. I don’t know what they want; I 
don’t know how they feel. I’ve got to hear those stories. I’ve got to listen to [the Mikisew 
member] on the boat; I’ve got to hear what his issues are. Then I’ve got to listen to 
someone else. Then I’ve got to listen to someone else. Then I’ve got to check with you 
[the GIR executives]. Then I’ve got to make sure I got the story – the context – right. And 
then I might advocate. I’m advocating, right? I’m not a decision-maker. I’m advocating 
for what I think people want. Then I check it. Then I go to leadership. Then we build 
something. [pers. comm. 21 August 2017] 
 
This informant highlights how successful representatives are cultural brokers, or flexible and 
effective facilitators of cross-cultural interactions (Jang 2014). While in the field, I met 
representatives who could, with seeming ease, navigate both remote towns and metropolitan 
high-rises; they could speak to land-users comfortably on their traplines, and they could translate 
members’ desires and lived experiences into policy recommendations. Acting as the intermediary 
between communities like MCFN and industry and government demands a unique interpretive 
skillset, Mikisew’s Regulatory Coordinator explained,  
I really do believe that engaging with the communities takes a unique skillset. It is 
something you can learn, but I think it’s about who you really are as a person. I think 
community members really respond to that. They know when they’re getting lip service 
as opposed to when somebody is very passionate about the issues. There’s also conveying 
messaging: I think, you know, we and industry and government struggle to convey 
Western science concepts, and you know, high-level technical issues, to community 
members in a way that it really resonates with them. And I think that’s a fine art. You just 
either have that skillset, or you don’t. [I-05, 28 July 2017] 
 
This utterance highlights the need to engage responsively with divergent audiences, as well as to 
communicate the regulatory and consultation jargon discussed in Chapter Three. Mikisew’s 
representatives must engage in cultural code-switching (Morton 2013), or move between 
different linguistic registers and entire social contexts through cultural knowledge (Brannen and 
Thomas 2010). Staff relies on code-switching to translate the substance of legalistic consultation 
frameworks and engagement sessions for audiences of elders, land-users, and concerned 
members. The same representatives then attempt to present often deeply place-based concerns 
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about matters such as land planning and reclamation plans in a manner that makes them 
translatable into policy and regulatory frameworks. In effect, consultation staff endeavour to act 
as modern-day cultural brokers. 
4.3.2 Going the distance? Representing impacted Indigenous communities from afar 
 An elected Mikisew council member explained that the GIR is meant to “bridge the gap” 
between the membership and government and industry (I-06, 29 July 2017). He explained that 
there is a divide between the membership focused in Fort Chipewyan, a remote fly-in hamlet, 
and their representatives in Fort McMurray. The councillor expanded,  
They bridge the gap from us to government; it’s huge. We live a bush life, like I was 
saying to you, we still hunt and trap and fish. We continue our way of life, and we don’t 
want that to be impacted. That’s why we have the GIR in place: to handle our 
government and industry relations. [I-06, 29 July 2017] 
 
With the help of steady industry funding (see Zalik 2016), the GIR’s geographical positioning at 
the nexus of the oil sands facilitates access to meetings in Fort McMurray itself, and direct 
flights to Calgary and Edmonton, where industry and government headquarters are typically 
situated. 
Yet divides between consultation offices and those they represent can also pose 
problems. Some Mikisew members are suspicious that the GIR is “in it for the money 
themselves,” according to a young member (I-01, 15 June 2017). This individual explained, “The 
community doesn’t understand that the projects would be approved anyway. The government 
makes their own rules” (I-01, 15 June 2017). Increased exposure to the office led this Mikisew 
member to recognize the difficulties and structural hindrances faced by GIR staff, and 
consequently to reflect favourably on the office’s efforts.  
The translation of such offices’ challenges and realities does not occur seamlessly with 
the membership. Indeed, even when offices are located within the membership base, as 
Gerbrandt (2015: 48) describes regarding the Woodland Cree First Nation, problems of 
organization and information dissemination can arise. In Ft. McMurray, GIR staff often try to 
mitigate the divide between themselves and the membership through outreach and engagement 
targeting crosscutting sectors of Mikisew’s membership. For example, the GIR hosts an annual 
summer retreat for elders, coordinates several events within Treaty Days targeted towards 
families and youth, and co-hosts an annual open roadshow with the Mikisew Group of 
Companies to update members on the office’s work. Mikisew’s GIR also regularly updates their 
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Facebook page with news and events that pertain to their day-to-day operations, and sends out 
hundreds of newsletters twice a year to an extensive mailing list that prioritizes elders and the 
GIR’s partners. These outreach strategies attempt to lessen the divide between Mikisew 
membership and the office.  
Mikisew would likely prefer to hire its own members – or other First Nations members – 
to staff the GIR. However, hiring workers from elsewhere is not uncommon due to the 
qualifications that such consultation positions often necessitate. External hires (i.e. non-Mikisew 
members) can make profound contributions to expanding local capacity (Wanvik and Caine 
2017: 600); they can amplify the GIR team’s ability to “cover themselves on many flanks,” or 
engage in all processes that merit or mandate Mikisew’s input, which is a profound and enduring 
struggle (I-04, 25 July 2017). Yet as the aforementioned Mikisew member hinted when 
discussing members’ suspicions of GIR offices, employees from elsewhere are affected 
differently – or minimally – by governance decisions than are members (I-01, 15 June 2017; 
Dokis 2015). Euro-Canadian consultation officers also inevitably have a different understanding 
of regional issues. 
4.3.3 Common motivations, differing mobilization patterns 
One informant, a seasoned manager in regulatory and consultation who has spent the last 
15 years working for First Nations in the Regional Municipality of Wood Buffalo, explained that 
while Indigenous peoples do share common values and priorities, they do have different 
approaches to energy governance: 
At the end of the day, all the communities, whether they’re First Nation or Métis in the 
region, kind of have the same outcome or goals in mind. They want to be at the table, 
they want to protect their interests to the best of their ability, but they differ in […] three 
different ways: the experience, the capacity, and the actual impacts on the community. [I-
05, 28 July 2017]  
 
Indigenous mobilization strategies are impacted by a variety of factors. Experience, capacity, and 
impacts – all of which are thoroughly intertwined – play into the mobilization that Indigenous 
peoples undertake in the oil sands region. The aforementioned informant explained,  
Having worked for [X community] and being out in [Y community], it’s a totally 
different experience […] Each of the communities north, south, and kind of central 
around Fort McMurray differ in their impacts. [I-05, 28 July 2017] 
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Expanding further, the informant noted that First Nations from Fort Chipewyan and Fort McKay 
have built capacity “based on need” (I-05, 28 July 2017): 
The communities in the south […] were really kind of almost in their infancy of engaging 
on some of these projects […] It was clear they were, you know, at least 10 years behind 
the other communities in knowing how to engage with industry on projects, knowing how 
to respond, knowing what the regulatory process is – knowing the systems, knowing the 
potential opportunities. [I-05, 28 July 2017] 
 
Evidently, communities’ approaches to strategic political action differ significantly, in part due 
to divergent past experiences in governance processes. 
The need to engage in consultation extends far beyond the vicinity of the Athabasca oil 
sands deposits. Reflecting on her fieldwork in the Peace River oil sands area (approximately 300 
kilometres southwest from McMurray), Gerbrandt (2015: 119-120) underscores that longer term 
funding and training are needed to harness the necessary skills and capacity to meaningfully 
engage in consultation. There is also a divide between Métis and First Nations groups in the 
Athabasca region. Recognition of Métis rights to land and governance has come later than that of 
First Nations, although Métis negotiating power is rapidly increasing today (Wanvik and Caine 
2017). Despite similar values and priorities, abilities to challenge economic activity that is 
incompatible with Indigenous rights vary greatly (Gerbrandt 2015; Joly and Westman 2017; 
Urquhart 2010).  
4.4 Looking Forward: The Continued Transformation of Indigenous Mobilization 
Informants sometimes raised an additional mobilization strategy of interest – that of 
“community-to-community” organization (I-07, 2 August 2017), or local alliances. A Dene 
Consultation Coordinator reflected,  
I don’t think you can get all of Treaty 8 into it, because it’s too divided, but I think for 
our own region, that there’s that real opportunity to band together and to address issues 
that way. I think that there are completely solutions to work forward. [I-08 6 August 
2017] 
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Informants commonly drew strength from the idea of allying together and uniting to find 
workable solutions to address the power imbalances that arise in regard to energy governance, as 
well as ensuing impacts. GIR Director Melody Lepine offered an example, saying, 
I look back at when the five nations did a press release in withdrawing our participation 
in JOSM [Joint Oil Sands Monitoring program], about three years ago… That was so 
powerful. We actually got Canada and Alberta to go back and say, ‘Holy shit, we 
dropped the ball here. We gotta change the way monitoring occurs...’ I mean, here we are 
so many years later, but that unity […] is powerful. [FG-01, 21 August  2017] 
 
As Melody’s example illustrates, some informants feel that the tide can turn in favour of 
Indigenous peoples when they collaborate to protect their rights and interests. Despite countless 
assertions that Indigenous peoples are at a clear disadvantage in consultation processes, certain 
informants did express a sense of hope when looking to the future.  
4.5 Conclusion 
As I elucidated in Chapter Three, extraction in Alberta is governed through conventionally 
closed political and social spaces. Indigenous peoples’ disruption of these traditionally exclusive 
governance circles may enhance the protection of their rights and interests. This chapter explored 
four primary means by which Indigenous peoples mobilize in the oil sands region: litigation, 
government consultation, industry negotiation processes, and advocacy. I highlighted previous 
research on Indigenous experiences regarding energy governance in the oil sands region in 
tandem with my primary findings, in order to reflect upon changing trends in mobilization, and 
perspectives on these strategies’ differential viability for advancing Indigenous interests. 
Divergences of opinion exist, as no single strategy is evidently a stand-alone solution. While my 
respondents offered particular attention to litigation, interviewees also asserted that the gains 
harnessed through industry negotiations underpin other forms of mobilization. The 
aforementioned strategies in the oil sands region are highly flexible, contextually dependent, and 
interrelated.  
Consultation offices, such as Mikisew’s GIR, aim to defend Indigenous interests and 
rights in negotiating energy development. This chapter shed light on the challenges posed by the 
role of regulatory and consultation staff in representing the needs and perspectives of the First 
Nation citizens that they serve. This section also explored the divergent mobilization patterns 
pursued by these offices, presenting several factors that may influence these strategic choices, 
including divergences in leadership, capacity, and impacts. This immersive research would merit 
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repetition with a larger group of respondents, and through longer-term fieldwork than a master’s 
degree can typically afford. Ultimately, like other Indigenous communities in the region, 
Mikisew and its representatives continue to explore and refine mobilization strategies to protect 
Aboriginal and treaty rights.   
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Chapter Five: Politicking Internationally: Mikisew at the World Heritage Committee 
5.1 Introduction 
The lobby was bustling with smartly dressed delegates, politicians, media crews, NGO 
representatives, and UNESCO staff. It was just after 1 p.m. on July 5th, 2017 at the 41st World 
Heritage Committee meeting. The midday sun was cascading across the polished floors and 
bright surfaces of the Krakow Convention Centre as the Canadian delegation approached us. A 
Canadian official began by asking bluntly, “Who do you think you are?” and admonished the 
handful of Mikisew Cree representatives for lobbying in Poland at the World Heritage 
Committee meeting. A few minutes of dialogue unfolded, the tension palpable across opposing 
sides of the table that separated us. Five of us had ventured overseas as the Mikisew Cree looked 
to promote the protection of Wood Buffalo National Park, Canada’s largest World Heritage Site. 
Later, GIR Director and Mikisew member Melody Lepine alluded to the turbulent political 
experiences at the World Heritage Committee meeting, stating with dismay, “Canada makes 
promises in public and then works against Indigenous peoples in private” (Nation Talk 2017). 
While the Canadian government outwardly champions reconciliation and environmental 
sustainability, tensions can emerge when Indigenous peoples promote the same ideals through 
advocacy. 
In 2017, my ethnographic fieldwork took me to Krakow, where Mikisew continued 
advocating as the committee ruled on the condition of Wood Buffalo and made 
recommendations for remedial action. This chapter assesses the underlying strategies and 
potential outcomes of international advocacy for MCFN. In Chapter Four, my informants 
identified lobbying and advocacy as the potentially least important form of political mobilization 
available to Indigenous communities in the oil sands region. Yet as will be explored here, 
although informants may not perceive advocacy as a viable long-term strategy for protecting 
communities’ rights and interests, some consultation offices such as the GIR are deploying a 
great deal of time and money into advocacy work to advance their aims. This chapter contributes 
to my investigation of the evolution of energy governance in Alberta by exploring Mikisew’s 
turn to the international community to facilitate recourse when the First Nation felt ongoing 
governance processes had failed. 
The Mikisew Cree First Nation initiated a petition to UNESCO in 2014, calling for the 
World Heritage Committee to place Wood Buffalo on the “World Heritage in Danger List,” due 
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to the environmental degradation witnessed in the park by the Mikisew members in recent 
decades. In the past few years, by garnering the continued attention and support of World 
Heritage Committee members and sympathetic professionals at the World Heritage Centre and 
its advisory bodies, the Mikisew Cree have been able to level a challenge at Canada’s 
management of the park. The UNESCO petition contests Canada’s commitment to 
environmental protection and reconciliation in the international public sphere. It thus constitutes 
an attempt at overturning the primacy of the Canadian state in managing its lands. Indeed, the 
advancement of the petition implicitly threw into question the sole sovereignty of the modern 
nation-state.  
5.2 The Impetus for an Appeal to UNESCO 
5.2.1 UNESCO Site #256: Wood Buffalo National Park  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wood Buffalo National Park (Figure 5.1) was founded in 1922, and established as UNESCO Site 
#256 in 1983. Wood Buffalo was the seventh site to receive the distinction in Canada (UNESCO 
Figure 5.1: Map of Wood Buffalo National Park [map]. Parks Canada, 
n.d.. Scale not given. In “Plan Your Visit.” http://www.pc.gc.ca/en/pn-
np/nt/woodbuffalo/visit/visit7/visit8 
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n.d.). The park was recognized for its properties of Outstanding Universal Value (OUV): the sole 
breeding habitat in the world for the endangered whooping crane; the only place in which the 
predator-prey relationship between wolves and wood bison has been unbroken over time; and the 
home to superlative natural phenomena such as salt plains, gypsum karst, and the world’s largest 
inland delta (the Peace-Athabasca Delta, or PAD) (World Heritage Centre and IUCN 2017).  
I explored Wood Buffalo and the PAD in early August 2017, first while traveling with 
GIR colleagues from Fort Chipewyan to Fort Smith (NWT) for a conference on water 
conservation. I was in awe of the lush greenery, the quiet calm of the PAD, and the way in which 
Mikisew land users navigated the meandering webs of waterways with utter ease. Without the 
expert eyes of Cree friends, I would have missed the black bear, lynx, herons, cranes, and grouse 
that a keen observer could spy as we made our way through the terrain of Wood Buffalo 
National Park and the PAD. The wood bison (Bison bison athabascae) could not be missed, as 
they are the largest land mammals in North America. During my second (August) visit to the 
park, I traveled through the PAD alongside Parks Canada employees and independent 
consultants during an engagement session organized to inform the Strategic Environmental 
Assessment being conducted for the park, at the request of the World Heritage Committee. The 
visiting government representatives confirmed my earlier impression, remarking that the beauty 
and serenity of Wood Buffalo leave an indelible impact upon those who experience the park 
firsthand.   
Canada established Wood Buffalo as a national park in 1922, in large part to protect the 
region’s wood bison, which were at the brink of extinction by the turn of the century, and to 
shield nearby Indigenous populations from competition with outside trappers (McCormack 1992: 
369). While the park received UNESCO designation as a natural site,22 Chipewyan and Cree 
presence in present-day Wood Buffalo National Park and the surrounding area has been recorded 
since contact (J. G. E. Smith 1987: 438). Eleven Indigenous populations in total – 6 First Nations 
and 5 Métis groups – have made distinct claims to occupy and exercise traditional rights on park 
lands. Treaty 8 nations such as Mikisew have been the only peoples entitled to hunt and trap in                                                         
22 The inscription of Wood Buffalo National Park on the World Heritage List occurred prior to the 
committee’s recognition of mixed properties, or sites selected in recognition of their exceptional cultural 
and natural heritage. Various members of the World Heritage Committee’s advisory bodies note that if 
Wood Buffalo were to be nominated today, it would have likely been classified as a mixed site (pers. 
comm. 30 June 2017). The classification of sites affects the scope of their management and oversight.  
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the park (McCormack 1992; Mikisew Cree 2005). Historic analysis sets forth that the Mikisew 
Cree have long relied on villages and traplines within the current bounds of the park (Appendix 
A; Candler 2012; McCormack 1989; 2010), which falls within Treaty 8 land. Fort Chipewyan is 
adjacent to the park, and Peace Point, one of the reserves Mikisew obtained through the Treaty 
Land Entitlement (1986), is located inside the park. The Supreme Court of Canada has 
reaffirmed Mikisew’s rights and title interests to areas of the park (Mikisew Cree 2005). Cree, 
Chipewyan, and Métis land use and history is deeply intertwined with Wood Buffalo, long 
preceding its designation as a national park and UNESCO site. 
5.2.2 Domestic context 
The water and lands surrounding Fort Chipewyan are a central part of their culture, 
Mikisew members reaffirmed through the course of my fieldwork. The aftershocks of intensive 
extraction have long accumulated downstream throughout Mikisew’s traditional lands and 
waters, arguably contrary to treaty obligations, and despite articulated concerns over 
environmental costs and the constitutional protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights. Treaty 8 
(1899) offered assurances to protect Mikisew’s way of life and livelihood within its traditional 
territory, much of which overlaps with park boundaries. More recently, Mikisew’s Treaty Land 
Entitlement Agreement (1986: 6) set out that Canada would correct anthropogenic changes to the 
PAD’s water regime. Yet the Mikisew Cree have felt heavy social, environmental, and cultural 
impacts of industrial activity upstream and anthropogenic climate change upon their traditional 
lands and waterways (McLachlan 2014).  
At 44,807 square kilometres, Wood Buffalo is the largest national park in Canada. Yet 
few Canadians visit the park, and most guests are from its surrounding area. In 2016-17, Wood 
Buffalo National Park hosted 3,340 visitors (Parks Canada 2017a): Although there were 7% 
more visitors than in the previous year, in 2016-17, Wood Buffalo hosted just 0.02% of recorded 
visitors across all national parks, park reserves, and marine conservation areas in Canada. The 
broader Canadian public overlooks Wood Buffalo, likely because of its relative remoteness. 
Widespread public ignorance regarding issues plaguing the site helped spur Mikisew to refocus 
its efforts for assistance abroad rather than domestically. 
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At World Heritage Watch, a pre-UNESCO conference in Krakow, GIR Director Melody 
Lepine told NGOs and other Indigenous representatives of the major threats to Wood Buffalo 
National Park (Figure 5.2): The Park and the PAD are rapidly deteriorating due to upstream 
industrial activities (namely bitumen extraction, municipal and agricultural presence; uranium 
and mineral exploration and extraction, and hydroelectric damming [see Government of Alberta 
1996]); climate change; long-term underinvestment in park management and staffing; and 
governance deficiencies (poor land-use planning, neglect of the cumulative effects of industrial 
expansion, and the dismantling of environmental legislation). The park faces a number of 
immediate threats, the World Heritage Centre and the International Union for the Conservation 
of Nature (IUCN) (2017) confirm. The park’s ecosystems have been under increasing stress 
since the 1960s, when upstream damming – namely the Bennett Dam, which opened in 1968 – 
began altering its hydrology (Carbyn et al. 1989; Indian Claims Commission 1998; McCormack 
1984). The PAD has been particularly impacted, due to its complex water recharge mechanisms 
(Beltaos et al. 2006; Peters et al. 2006).23 Mikisew felt it had exhausted all domestic avenues to 
protect the Park, in light of decades of inaction. 
                                                        
23 Hydrologist and geomorphologist Carver (2013; 2014) asserts that the forthcoming Site C Dam will 
likely add to this pressure.  
Figure 5.2: Melody Lepine addresses World Heritage Watch. (Photo by author, 30 June 2017)  
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5.3 Thinking Internationally: Indigenous Mobilization Beyond Northern Alberta 
5.3.1 Indigenous mobilization in the oil sands region 
A Mikisew member noted that the regulatory system is “so broken and so flawed it does nothing 
to meet [their] community’s interests” (FG-01, 21 August 2017). Indeed, a growing body of 
research documents the tokenistic implementation of state-led governance processes (Ritchie 
2013), which leaves First Nations and Métis peoples feeling powerless (Baker and Westman 
2018), and limits public participation (Bowness and Hudson 2014; O’Faircheallaigh 2010). As 
Chapter Four elaborated, Indigenous mobilization is thoroughly impacted by the relegation of 
governance duties to proponents in the oil sands region (Joly and Westman 2017; Wanvik 2016). 
Facing structural barriers to meaningful engagement and consultation in governance processes 
(McCormack 2016), Indigenous peoples are taking strategic and pragmatic approaches to protect 
their rights (Wanvik and Caine 2017). Groups such as Mikisew are persuaded to investigate 
novel strategies to enhance the oversight of extraction on traditional lands. Yet ethnographic 
investigation into such work remains limited.  
5.3.2 Going international: Broadening networks of cooperation 
Public acknowledgment of and political commitments to Indigenous rights are increasing 
(TRC 2015). Growing global recognition predicates and encourages international advocacy 
work. Indigenous groups tend to turn to global audiences for support when they feel their rights 
and values are not, and cannot, be protected through domestic structures (Niezen and Sapignoli 
2017).24 New forms of resistance that attempt to capitalize on the power of shame are emerging 
in the face of complex social problems like environmental degradation and Indigenous rights. 
Indigenous peoples are actively adopting new strategies of resistance by expanding their 
strategies to international networks with potentially greater implications for state power (P. 
Smith 2015). Niezen (2003: 186) notes that the “politics of shame” are gaining prominence in 
spheres such as the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations, as groups re-appropriate the 
discursive trends tied to Indigenous rights and reconciliation that are being increasingly adopted 
by nation-states. Indigenous peoples highlight the divide between words and action, in hopes of 
advancing reconciliation and rights recognition. Such resistance strategies provide powerful 
framing for understanding Mikisew’s work at UNESCO.                                                         
24 In the Canadian context, this is exemplified by the work of the James Bay Cree in the 1980s at the 
World Health Organization and the United Nations (Niezen 2003), as well as that of the Lubicon Cree in 
the 1990s at the Human Rights Committee and beyond (Laboucan-Massimo 2014). 
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5.3.3 Social research in world heritage forums 
UNESCO and the implementation of the World Heritage Convention are often 
investigated through the lens of heritage studies, while ethnographic investigation into the 
governance of world heritage is in its nascence. Heritage studies offer a comprehensive review of 
UNESCO’s evolution over time, highlighting its contributions to capacity building and the 
conservation of heritage worldwide (Cameron 2015). Notably, analyses of notions of culture and 
value within the world heritage system have also emerged (Aplin 2007; Eriksen 2001; Rössler 
2006). In recent years, anthropologists posit that the implementation of the World Heritage 
Convention is increasingly politicized (Bjerregaard and Nielsen 2014; Brumann 2012; Meskell 
2015). Critical ethnographic approaches demonstrate that world heritage proceedings are driven 
by state interests; Social anthropologist Brumann (2014) notes that representatives on the World 
Heritage Committee, made up of a rotating membership of 21 countries, are largely no longer 
heritage experts but career diplomats. Increasingly, the literature has begun to address the 
exclusion of Indigenous peoples from discussions and structures overseeing world heritage 
(Meskell 2013b), as well as Indigenous experiences of site designations (e.g., Scholze 2008). Yet 
Indigenous engagement in committee meetings, which can aim to enhance oversight into site 
management, has seldom been assessed. My chapter adds to this emerging body of ethnographic 
research by attending to Mikisew’s experience petitioning UNESCO.   
5.4 Rallying at UNESCO 
UNESCO adopted the Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage in 1972. The World Heritage Convention is one of the few international treaties that 
apply global responsibility to sovereign national territories (Brumann 2014). Canada accepted 
the World Heritage Convention in 1976. As of 2017, there are 1073 sites inscribed on the World 
Heritage List. 
Mikisew filed a petition to the World Heritage Committee in December 2014, mindful 
that international recognition of the threats endangering Wood Buffalo could spur further 
oversight and the establishment of a comprehensive corrective program. In the field, I learnt that 
the main motivating factor that compelled Mikisew to petition UNESCO for an in-danger listing 
for Wood Buffalo National Park was the proposed Teck Frontier oil sands mine (Fieldnotes 11 
June 2017). The petition prompted UNESCO and the IUCN to send a joint mission of world-
renowned scientists to monitor Wood Buffalo in September 2016. The mission report was 
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published in early 2017. The experts agreed with all of Mikisew’s concerns, and established 17 
recommendations for Canada, in order to address the deterioration of the Outstanding Universal 
Value of Wood Buffalo National Park (World Heritage Centre and IUCN 2017). 
Mikisew continued to engage with the World Heritage Centre, advisory bodies, and 
committee members between meetings. The GIR sent representatives to the 39th meeting in 
Bonn, Germany, in 2015. The GIR’s legal counsel and director went to Paris, France, in May 
2017 to engage in advance lobbying and to rally support before the 41st session.  
5.4.1 Advocacy at the 41st World Heritage Committee meeting 
In June 2017, the World Heritage Centre released the draft decision on Wood Buffalo in 
the lead-up to the 41st committee meeting (UNESCO 2017). Alongside staff at the Mikisew GIR 
and allying organizations, I pored over the drafts. The decision (41 COM 7B.2, herein referred to 
as the Krakow decision) maintained earlier statements made by the committee: It reaffirmed the 
Bonn decision (39 COM 7B.18) (UNESCO 2015), which called for Canada to, among other 
things, make no irreversible decisions that may impact the park prior to a full strategic 
environmental assessment of the cumulative effects of industrial activity on the park’s OUV.25 
The draft decision also requested that Canada allocate adequate means for an action plan; fully 
implement all recommendations from the Reactive Monitoring Mission (World Heritage Centre 
and IUCN 2017); and more. Canada was asked to submit formal progress reports to UNESCO in 
February and December of 2018. 
While Mikisew’s GIR was relatively pleased with the draft decision, their representatives 
attended the World Heritage Committee meeting in Poland to advocate for the park. They pushed 
for amendments to the draft decision, in order to adopt tighter timelines for action, and more 
robust mechanisms to ensure the protection of the PAD. At the same time, they aimed to ensure 
Canada did not convince committee members that concerns over Wood Buffalo were already 
being managed, which would weaken the committee’s recommendations. I was invited to 
accompany Mikisew to the meeting, in large part due to my immersion in the UNESCO file 
since arriving in Fort McMurray. I gratefully accepted the invitation and accompanied the GIR’s 
                                                        
25 The Strategic Environmental Assessment for Wood Buffalo National Park was released in May 2018. 
“Desired outcomes for the world heritage values are not being met,” according to the report, whose ties 
into future decision-making are not yet certain (Weber 2018b). 
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Director and Manager of Government Relations, as well as two campaign managers with several 
decades of experience in environmental advocacy.26 
We landed in Poland on the 29th of June. Several days prior to the opening ceremonies, 
the Mikisew team began reaching out to committee members, as well as contacts and allies at the 
World Heritage Centre and the IUCN. Much as anthropologist Schia (2013) discovered while 
working at the UN Security Council, I found that some of the more important conversations at 
UNESCO occur outside the actual recorded proceedings (Figure 5.3, below). Delegations 
convened over coffee; NGO activists and lobbyists waited by the hall doors to engage with 
decision-makers; alliances and strategies were born outside the ongoing sessions. Mikisew 
representatives campaigned over the course of a week prior to the decision on WBNP, from 
dawn to dusk. I made myself useful by providing support to the Mikisew team, editing and 
translating documents as necessary, and acting as translator during conversations with World 
Heritage Committee members who spoke French and Spanish. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: The lobby of the Krakow Convention Centre, a bustling hub for politicking and planning. 
(Photo by author, 3 July 2017) 
The Mikisew delegation clashed with Canadian officials in Krakow, as the chapter’s 
opening scene illustrates. Mikisew perceived Canada to be campaigning just as hard to lessen the 
power of the Wood Buffalo decision as they themselves were campaigning to strengthen it.                                                         
26 My attendance was enabled by the financial support of the Mikisew GIR and the University of 
Saskatchewan. 
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Dramatic lobbying characterized by combative interactions and calls back home to respective 
principals ensued in the lead-up to the official decision on Wood Buffalo. Ultimately, the 
resolution passed as it had been originally drafted. In the days following July 5th, Mikisew 
representatives in Krakow commented that they’d been made to feel like a child that had 
embarrassed their parents by acting distastefully in public. A Campaign Manager hired by 
Mikisew for the World Heritage Committee meeting reflected on the incident, saying,  
When you get attitudes like that on full display to you, it beggars belief, really […] It’s 
really so offensive. I don’t expect that from bureaucrats to Indigenous people. It’s beyond 
old fashioned. It demonstrates, fundamentally, things haven’t changed. Basically, 
[Indigenous people] are problems to be managed. [I-02, 7 July 2017] 
 
Mikisew representatives in Poland highlighted the paternalistic undercurrents of their 
interactions with the Canadian delegation, which only grew starker as the decision approached, 
and it became apparent that Canada had the upper hand politically.  
5.4.2 Rallying different audiences through divergent messaging 
Mikisew overtly employed the politics of shame (Niezen 2003) to force action on the 
environmental issues plaguing Wood Buffalo. Speaking of the possible repercussions of listing 
the Park as “In Danger,” Lepine told the CBC, “I think it would be a huge embarrassment to 
Canada — showing the committee and the world they can't manage a site, they can't take care of 
a site,” (Riebe 2017). Mikisew projected members’ concerns upon a world stage by calling into 
question Canada’s management of its most treasured assets. In doing so, Mikisew capitalized 
upon, and further exposed, Canada’s vulnerability regarding its reputation overseas. At 
UNESCO, Mikisew focused its key messages upon the need to protect world heritage and foster 
environmental conservation. Since initially filing the petition to UNESCO, the Mikisew Cree 
have articulated their concerns in terms of the OUV of the park itself, as follows: 
For generations, the rich lands and waters of the Peace-Athabasca Delta have been a 
cultural homeland that supports our way of life, and a uniquely Mikisew relationship to 
the environment […] Over hundreds of years, our relationship to the delta has shaped us, 
and we have helped shape it through actively managing the flow of water within our 
lands. [MCFN 2016: 6]  
 
Mikisew draws explicit links between themselves and the maintenance of a healthy park. Melody 
Lepine’s address to the World Heritage Committee in the wake of the Krakow decision in Poland 
exhibited similar messaging. She pressed,  
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…As the original petitioners to the committee, the Mikisew Cree will continue to fight 
for the ecological viability of the world’s largest freshwater delta. We are committed to 
the protection of the outstanding universal value of this world-renowned site, as the 
Convention requires. Moving forward, we require the committee’s strong support in 
holding Canada accountable to protecting Wood Buffalo National Park. 
 
While campaigning internationally, concerns about the land and the water were articulated in 
terms of ecological integrity and OUV, the rationale underlying the site’s initial recognition. The 
reframing of Mikisew’s plea for assistance is evident in these passages: The First Nation’s 
UNESCO appeal seized the central discourses and values espoused by the World Heritage 
Centre, advisory bodies, and committee members in order to enhance the validity of its call for 
meaningful change, and render its concerns amenable to the scope of the Convention.  
 Mikisew’s public relations efforts focused on the seeming disjunction between the federal 
government’s messaging and its actions. While on the phone with federal authorities and 
ministerial staff in Ottawa, Mikisew executives discussed reconciliation and the constitutional 
protection of their treaty rights as major points of concern. In doing so, Mikisew rallied around 
interests that have been central to the incumbent federal government mandates.  
Mikisew also capitalized on the timing of Canada’s 150th anniversary in 2017 – which 
brought free admission to all national parks – to emphasize the seeming contradictions in 
national priorities. Speaking to the Canadian Parks and Wilderness Society, Lepine noted,  
It says a lot about Canada’s relationship with Mikisew and other Indigenous communities 
that we spent Canada’s 150th anniversary in Europe seeing Canada resist efforts to save a 
World Heritage Site. [CPAWS 2017] 
 
While national parks featured as a central point of celebration during Canada’s 150th anniversary, 
Mikisew was in Europe fighting for the park that they had stewarded since long before its formal 
establishment as a protected area (MCFN 2014). Mikisew’s executives emphasized Canadian 
attachment to national parks in order to highlight the incongruity posed by federal inaction in 
regard to Wood Buffalo.  
Additionally, Mikisew was also able to tie the UNESCO work into relevant domestic 
debates to raise awareness about the plight of the park. For instance, media attention targeting 
British Columbia audiences highlighted the inclusion of the contentious Site C Dam in 
UNESCO’s decisions (e.g., Ball 2017; Pynn 2017). Stressing UN scrutiny over the dam has been 
a point of leverage for Mikisew to raise the profile of the UNESCO work: “Now, with the Site C, 
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the entire unique ecosystem is at risk — there’s a fear we may no longer have the world’s largest 
freshwater delta at all,” Lepine highlighted in an interview with Vancouver’s Metro News (Ball 
2017). Site C has now been approved for construction, a decision Lepine admonished as a 
“reconciliation fail” (Kurjata 2017). Correspondence and engagement between Mikisew and 
Canadian publics during and since the Poland meeting have centred upon connecting the 
UNESCO advocacy to issues at the forefront of domestic politics.  
The GIR’s endeavours to highlight the UNESCO intervention with allies, as well as in 
public submissions and communications, have spurred additional focus on Wood Buffalo 
National Park in the House of Commons (Duncan 2016; 2017; Rabson 2017; Stetski 2016; 
2017). Mikisew’s increasing experience politicking has resulted in the selective application of 
diverse discursive tools, in order to mobilize politics of shame and to force meaningful action 
and intervention on the part of Canada. 
5.4.3 Advocacy at UNESCO: Opportunities and challenges 
Given that decision-making at UNESCO is vulnerable to politics (Brumann 2014), 
advocacy work has provided the Mikisew Cree First Nation with a number of major 
opportunities. International attention has helped raise the profile of Mikisew’s struggles both 
within and beyond Canadian borders. The UNESCO petition authenticates the First Nation’s 
perspective and furthers its standing as a key stakeholder in the park: Following the IUCN’s 
Reactive Monitoring Mission, Canada could no longer ignore Mikisew’s concerns on the 
declining ecological health of Wood Buffalo, as the Mission Report (World Heritage Centre and 
IUCN 2017) recognized these concerns as well-founded. Engaging in the high-profile forum 
provided by UNESCO enables Mikisew to capitalize on the prestige of the UN body and its 
expansive sphere of influence. Ultimately, mobilization at UNESCO increases awareness of the 
importance of the region’s environmental protection, and reinforces the central role Mikisew 
seeks in related interventions. 
However, UNESCO-based advocacy also poses unique challenges, as the implementation 
of the World Heritage Convention occurs in traditionally closed diplomatic spaces (Brumann 
2015). First, the World Heritage Committee structure deters public engagement. For instance, 
Indigenous groups and non-profit organizations are offered the opportunity to speak only 
following decisions. Such structural impediments to non-state engagement mean that the groups 
are restricted to expressing themselves by making passionate, rushed two-minute monologues, or 
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through behind-the-scenes campaigning with committee members, which is the voting bloc 
central to the World Heritage structure. Second, state actors dominate the management of world 
heritage. World Heritage Committee meetings are highly vulnerable to national political 
considerations. As Brumann (2014) and Meskell (2013a) document, states lobby and rally 
together to fulfill national wishes that run counter to the recommendations of the World Heritage 
Committee’s advisory bodies, which are the IUCN, the International Centre for the Study of the 
Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM), and the International Council on 
Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS). While the World Heritage Convention implies supranational 
responsibility for world heritage, the inclination of UN bodies overseeing heritage conservation 
is to trust member states (Brumann 2014). As such, direct oversight of states’ processes is 
limited. Committee members are thus reluctant to respond to lobbying and narratives that set into 
question other states’ conservation practices (Meskell 2013a). Overall, sustained UN attention 
may be lacking regarding the concerns of Indigenous communities. 
5.5 The Decision: A Final Verdict, and Immediate Responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 5.4: Melody Lepine addresses the World Heritage Committee after a decision is taken  
on Wood Buffalo National Park. (Photo by anonymous member of foreign press, 5 July 2017) 
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Following nearly a week of intense campaigning in Poland, Wood Buffalo’s case arose on the 
committee meeting agenda. Wood Buffalo was addressed alongside handful of verdicts prior to 
the more contentious case of Białowieża Forest in Poland, Europe’s last primary forest (BBC 
News 2017). The verdicts were passed in one fell swoop just prior to the committee’s lunch 
break on July 5th, 2017. While Mikisew had hoped to open the Krakow decision to add an 
emphasis on water governance and tighten Canada’s reporting timelines, the team was ultimately 
unable to open the decision for discussion on the committee floor.  
At 12:55 p.m., Melody Lepine rose to address the World Heritage Committee following 
the decision (Figure 5.4): 
[…] After 30 years of Canadian inaction on the pervasive problems in Wood Buffalo, we 
felt it was critical to have as strong a decision as possible. Unfortunately, Canada has 
demonstrated great resistance to making even the most modest alterations to this 
decision. 
Constructive attempts at dialogue and resolution with Canada, aimed at strengthening the 
decision, have been entirely dismissed. In fact, we were shocked yesterday at the utter 
dismissal of the Mikisew’s concerns. We do not believe Canada’s claim that they are 
committed to a genuine partnership and have yet to see any actions from Canada to 
demonstrate it will protect Wood Buffalo in the manner required by the Convention. It 
has now been 11,000 days since Canada told us they would fix the Delta; it has been over 
10 years since [Canada] said they would look into our community’s health concerns.  
Our community is not convinced that Canada is acting in good faith. […]   
Moreover, to the Mikisew Cree First Nation, the park is already in danger – our health, 
quality of life and the ecological integrity of our delta, is diminished due to increasing 
water loss, contamination, and the prioritization of industrial development over local 
wellbeing […]  
 
Lepine articulated the First Nation’s frustration with Canada. She hinted at the political 
campaigning Mikisew had been doing with committee members, while focusing on the most 
pressing matter: Federal inaction in the face of impending ecological collapse. MCFN’s response 
highlighted the logic underlying their resorting to advocacy overseas, as they made an appeal for 
sustained engagement from the oversight body. Mikisew representatives were disappointed that 
they could not have the committee’s decision reinforced. Yet they recognized that the 
committee’s decision still constituted a powerful lever to pursue conservation initiatives back in 
Canada, as it prescribes a range of corrective actions and further research initiatives to improve 
ecological conditions within Wood Buffalo National Park. 
UN forums prioritize member states; other entities struggle to play a prominent role in 
managing world heritage (Brumann 2015: 274; Meskell 2013b). Indigenous mobilization is even 
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more challenging when groups with differing priorities take to such forums. The result may be a 
weakening of each individual claim. This was the situation in Krakow, when representatives 
from the Northwest Territory Métis Nation also attended the committee meeting. The Métis 
Nation representatives capitalized on Wood Buffalo’s discussion abroad, as Mikisew has, to 
advocate for their rights. The Métis Nation also addressed UNESCO after they took a decision 
on Wood Buffalo. Their address articulated the complex, conflict-riddled history of the park. As 
McCormack (1984) documents, Métis peoples were excluded from the park soon after its 
opening. This exclusion continues to be a major source of grievance and contention. The Métis 
Nation also expressed support for the Committee decision to offer Canada one last chance to take 
remedial action in park management, deviating significantly from Mikisew’s stance that the 
decision was not strong enough. Subsequently, World Heritage Committee delegates expressed 
confusion over the context in Wood Buffalo. The split in messaging also destabilized the 
centrality that Mikisew had been trying to harness as rights-holders; Mikisew representatives 
worried that the special position they had attempted to cultivate as petitioner to UNESCO was 
compromised.27 Mikisew’s ability to speak authoritatively at the proceedings was visibly 
weakened. 
Evidently, this occurrence reinforces the need to ally domestically and work 
collaboratively with other Indigenous peoples, as discussed in Chapter Four. Uniting the 11 
Indigenous groups surrounding Wood Buffalo is critical in hopes of rallying sustained 
international support for the park. One would imagine that a well-resourced First Nation like 
Mikisew would be well positioned to lead such collaboration. Failing to engage with 
neighbouring communities potentially undermines Mikisew’s ability to advocate effectively. 
Operating alone thus runs contrary to MCFN’s stated aim to conserve Wood Buffalo National 
Park. 
                                                        
27 This concern was reaffirmed in debrief meetings with Mikisew’s campaign team. My notes read, 
“…Building a more formalized and overt coalition with the other park-based Indigenous groups would be 
helpful, as it would strengthen local decision-making, help counter […] the government’s ‘divide and 
conquer’ strategies, and undermine attempts to confuse the committee regarding Indigenous perspectives 
and priorities for Wood Buffalo” (Fieldnotes 7 July 2017). Mikisew’s team recognized that working 
unilaterally (i.e. without allying with nearby Indigenous communities) weakened their chances at 
successful international campaigning. 
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5.5.1 Outcomes of advocacy: Reflecting on the decision 
In response to the verdict on July 5, Canada’s Environment Minister immediately issued 
a press release that welcomed the Krakow decision and mentioned the need to engage in capacity 
building with Indigenous peoples to ensure the park’s protection (Parks Canada, 2017b). 
Mikisew representatives in Poland were floored, calling the response “patronizing and cheap” 
(Fieldnotes 5 July 2017). In Mikisew’s view, the federal response discounted the tremendous 
capacity that was required to garner international attention and successfully level a challenge 
against Canada within the UN system. Following the committee meeting, Mikisew continues to 
work with NGO partners to garner media attention (e.g., CBC News 2017c; Galloway 2017), in 
hopes of fostering and sustaining public pressure on the federal government to respond in full to 
UNESCO’s recommendations.  
At the request of the World Heritage Committee, Canada has set an action plan in 
motion, with Parks Canada at the helm. Several challenges persist in improving conditions in 
Wood Buffalo. In general, the political will to improve the state of the park in the wake of the 
committee meeting appears to be lacking. All responsibilities have been relegated to Parks 
Canada. Yet in conversations and meetings, Parks’ own officers concede their agency is low in 
technical capacity, financial assets, and decision-making power. In an interview, Mikisew’s legal 
counsel emphasized that getting effective government engagement is “constantly elusive” (I-04, 
25 July 2017). The UNESCO work appears to be no exception. Mikisew representatives reaffirm 
that engagement on Canada’s action plan has been preliminary and piecemeal (pers. comm. 11 
December 2017). Canada argues that inter-jurisdictional issues and the number of Indigenous 
claims to rights in the park are major barriers to fully responding to the UNESCO 
recommendations. Mikisew maintains its reservations about the efficacy of domestic intervention 
in the wake of the decision, arguing that the lack of transparency and cooperation exhibited by 
Canada is damning for the park. 
As was explored in Chapter Four, representatives of First Nations in the Fort McMurray 
area continue to have apprehensions regarding the utility of advocacy in protecting rights in the 
oil sands region. Evidently, the work does not stop once Indigenous groups garner international 
attention: implementation of state parties’ responses requires constant policing. The onus is on 
Mikisew, other rights-holders, and concerned stakeholders to ensure that they are duly consulted 
and incorporated in subsequent interventions, and to appeal for continual involvement from 
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oversight bodies and allies within the world heritage network. This burden is enhanced by the 
proliferation of engagement opportunities documented in Chapter Three. Given the sheer number 
of forums demanding participation from Indigenous groups around Wood Buffalo, fully policing 
the actual implementation of reforms is a challenge.  
The Krakow decision has elevated the impetus for further conservation measures in 
Wood Buffalo, and its recommendations offer engaged communities and stakeholders political 
leverage. Yet the ultimate outcomes of UNESCO-based advocacy are uncertain. Advancing 
high-profile campaigns is undoubtedly onerous. This is compounded by the burden of holding 
jurisdictional powers to account domestically. To date, it is not yet apparent that the results of 
advocacy work compensate for the energy and resources invested in such initiatives. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter assessed Mikisew’s experience engaging in advocacy work under the World 
Heritage Convention, reflecting upon their attempt to mobilize at UNESCO for greater decision-
making influence on governance in the oil sands region. This ethnographic account of advocacy 
at UNESCO has enabled an immersive assessment of the process of communicating Indigenous 
concerns in manners that resonate with broader publics. Direct advocacy at the World Heritage 
Committee has aimed to conserve Mikisew’s traditional lands and waters by reaching above and 
beyond existing energy governance processes, for international recourse. Adopting messages 
tailored to divergent domestic and international audiences has rendered Mikisew’s concerns 
about its traditional lands amenable to the scope of the World Heritage Convention. While 
abroad, the oppositional nature of interactions between Canada and Mikisew demonstrated 
Canadian vulnerability to the politics of shame. It also put into question Canada’s desire to 
embody and practice the principles of reconciliation that are openly espoused at home.  
The outcomes of Mikisew’s campaign work at UNESCO are mixed thus far. Their 
advocacy has been successful in validating Mikisew’s concerns over the ecological viability of 
the park, and in enhancing domestic awareness of environmental threats to in Wood Buffalo. Yet 
at the same time, lacking collaboration with other First Nations and Métis groups with interests 
in Wood Buffalo National Park has weakened Mikisew’s ability to command international 
oversight. 
Wood Buffalo National Park and the Peace-Athabasca Delta are still in a precarious state. 
The lack of clear progress since the Krakow decision may validate uncertainty over the efficacy 
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of advocacy work (as established in Chapter Four). Although the Krakow decision offers an 
opportunity to engage in reconciliation in action, and recommends many processes to incorporate 
Indigenous input into governance, the long-term outcomes of this distinctive mobilization 
strategy have yet to be seen. The implementation of UNESCO’s recommendations to address 
deteriorating ecological conditions in the Park appears to be largely reliant upon the will and 
processes of the Canadian government.    
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
6.1 Introduction 
This thesis explored the ongoing political negotiation of bitumen extraction, by attending to the 
perspectives and experiences of actors engaged in energy governance in Alberta. Institutional 
ethnography was an ideal methodological approach for my investigation, as it provided the 
opportunity for an immersion in the social and political contexts of energy governance. My 
research has attended to the manner in which broader societal shifts, such as regulatory reforms 
and the nascent national project of reconciliation, influence these governance processes. Over the 
span of four months of fieldwork, I engaged in meetings, participatory forums, and other 
political processes alongside First Nations’ representatives. Based in Fort McMurray, I assisted 
Mikisew’s Government and Industry Relations office as I conducted my participatory 
ethnographic research. While I originally set out to explore Indigenous communities’ 
experiences mobilizing for greater protection of their rights and interests in the oil sands region, I 
ultimately engaged with a broader network of practitioners and other actors who negotiate 
energy extraction in Alberta. Alongside GIR staff, I travelled across Alberta, into the Northwest 
Territories, and ultimately to the World Heritage Committee in Europe as I investigated and 
participated in energy governance negotiations. The scope of my research widened throughout 
my fieldwork, as my initial focus on Indigenous rights and mobilization led to broader 
discussions on the regulatory environment in Alberta, and to the process of negotiating energy 
governance in a hotly contested extractive zone. Ultimately, my fieldwork exposed me to the 
epistemic community that oversees extraction in northern Alberta. This chapter concludes by 
reviewing my research limitations, making recommendations for future study, and ultimately 
reflecting on my findings to assess their significance in light of the broader pursuit towards 
reconciliation in Canada.  
6.2 Research Limitations and Recommendations 
Despite calls to “study up” and “study through” power relations and policymaking 
contexts (Nader 1972; Shore and Wright 2006), anthropologists are reluctant to engage in long-
term investigations of political spaces. The governance of energy extraction is imbued with 
conflicting ideas about public interest, development, and progress. As such, it is critical that 
social scientists immerse themselves ethnographically in the institutions that oversee and 
negotiate industrial activity and consultation. Governance as social practice merits further 
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investigation. In northern Alberta, longer-term immersion in the offices and consultation hubs of 
First Nations and Métis communities could provide further insights on political mobilization in 
Canada, as well as the translation of members’ values and experiences into institutionally 
recognizable and actionable knowledge. The degree to which consultation processes reflect 
revolving door and capture dynamics should also be investigated further. While social scientific 
attention to oil sands extraction is increasing, there is still space for further study of Canada’s 
largest industrial project. Researchers tend to undervalue the concept of regulatory capture in 
research assessing extraction in Alberta, despite its popularity among regional actors and 
stakeholders. The public at large would benefit from supplementary consideration of capture, and 
means of combating this phenomenon.  
In future studies, research methods investigating regulatory capture and the revolving 
door should be enhanced to ensure reliability. My findings would be augmented by further 
quantitative, and particularly statistical, research. For instance, a wider, more systematic 
investigation of the revolving door principle is merited. For this to occur, the pursuit of a broad 
social network analysis that assesses connections between staff at government, industry, and 
community offices is necessary; future research must strive to secure a more representative 
sample. When investigating the strategies used to enhance Aboriginal and treaty rights, engaging 
in a broader survey of staff involved in energy governance in the oil sands region would 
strengthen the findings and conclusions set forth in Chapter Four. Further use of focus groups 
may also be enlightening; I intend to pursue this method due to the added insights mine brought 
to the lines of investigation I pursued. 
Critical social research is especially warranted as rhetorical political tides continue to turn 
in favour of espousing participatory resource management, sustainability, and reconciliation. As 
one informant pointed out when discussing reconciliation, the rhetoric shifts that we are 
witnessing across the country – and especially among its political leaders – can be “a step in the 
right direction if it is followed by actions” (I-04, 25 July 2017). On the other hand, “if it is a way 
of whitewashing the status quo, it is dangerous, because it is harder to push back against” (I-04, 
25 July 2017). The discursive gaps that may arise between these stated broad societal aims and 
their actualization in governance processes is critical. Rhetorical devices, as well as their 
operationalization and reverberations in political spheres, necessitate anthropological attention. 
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6.3 Reconciliation at the Heart of Canadian Extractive Industry 
Prospects for the actualization of a nation-to-nation relationship between Indigenous 
peoples and the Crown are overcast by the closed nature of energy governance processes in 
Alberta. Informants often characterized the AER as a regulatory system that has been captured 
by industry. My analysis provided this notion with preliminary support: Chapter Three 
demonstrated that individuals with experience in regulatory and consultation work move quite 
regularly between professional positions in major sectors governing the region (i.e., government 
agencies, community offices, and industry), suggesting that there is a revolving door between 
these sectors.  
In the past few years, the Alberta Energy Regulator has undergone a series of structural 
reforms meant to enhance its legitimacy and transparency, in order to improve its reputation in 
the wake of mounting global criticism. This regulatory overhaul – among other factors – has 
catalyzed a wide range of participatory processes. Nevertheless, widespread concerns persist 
regarding the ongoing negotiation of extraction in northern Alberta. My informants assert that 
First Nations and Métis voices are systematically discounted in Alberta’s energy governance 
systems. These concerns are not unfounded; my findings suggest that ongoing regulatory and 
consultation processes persistently sideline Indigenous voices. Public interest is currently 
conflated with economic growth in Alberta. Despite the emergence of additional participatory 
processes, decision-making is financially oriented, and often industry-directed. Aboriginal and 
treaty rights are often disregarded in the province’s regulatory system.  
The political action taken by the GIR and other consultation offices in the Fort McMurray 
area constitutes a form of ongoing agonistic reconciliation (Tully 2004) with the Crown, as 
Indigenous peoples and their representatives endeavour to further dialogical, participatory 
engagement. The GIR’s employees are cultural brokers who strive to translate Mikisew’s needs 
and concerns into complex regulatory and consultative processes.  
The GIR selectively and strategically engages in litigation, government consultation, 
industry negotiations, and advocacy. These strategies are adopted depending on various factors, 
including impacts, capacity, and direction from leadership. My informants perceive litigation to 
be the most valuable means of mobilization. Views of consultation and negotiation with 
government and industry are mixed, although the GIR, like other IRCs, relies on financial 
capacity harnessed through negotiations with project proponents to engage politically. Advocacy 
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is perceived as the least viable option for protecting Indigenous rights and priorities; such 
campaigns appear to be a last resort, considered only after all domestic options have been 
exhausted. Ultimately, such strategies are interrelated, and deployed in contextually dependent 
manners. 
The UNESCO case study may authenticate concerns expressed over the viability of 
advocacy, due to its capital-intensiveness and indeterminate outcomes. Yet Mikisew’s advocacy 
at the World Heritage Committee is also a testament to the capacity of MCFN and its 
representatives: International oversight has prompted the recommendation of a range of research 
and conservation interventions in a critical ecological region that has been inundated by the 
impacts of industrial activity for decades.  
For promises of reconciliation to become tangible in the oil sands region, meaningful 
consultation is vital. In order to reflect government commitments and broad societal aims, the 
public interest should be applied in a manner that honours the constitutional protection of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights, and incorporates stated aims to reconcile Indigenous-Canadian 
relations. Evidently, reconciling and balancing the interests of broader Canadian and pre-existing 
Indigenous societies is an ongoing but worthy pursuit.   
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Appendix A: Mikisew’s Consultation Boundaries  
 
Appendix A. Map delineating the boundaries established by Mikisew, within which consultation 
is expected (Map by Mikisew Cree First Nation Government & Industry Relations, n.d.). 
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Appendix B: Consent Form 
 
Project Title:  An Ethnography of Oil Sands Energy Governance: Negotiating 
Development and Indigenous Rights in Northern Alberta    
Researcher:  
Katie Wheatley, Master’s Candidate, Archaeology and Anthropology 
Clint Westman, Archaeology and Anthropology 
Purpose(s) and Objective(s) of the Research:  
Ethnographic and interview research relating to energy. 
Procedures:  
We will be asking you some questions about your experiences with government and industry in 
terms of energy development. We will provide you with a copy of the interview transcript and 
give you the opportunity to discuss any concerns you have at that time. You may terminate the 
interview or revoke permission at any time. 
Please feel free to ask any questions regarding the procedures and goals of the study or your 
role. 
 
Funded by: Social Science and Humanities Research Council; Northern Scientific Training 
Program; University of Saskatchewan Anthropology Trust Fund 
Potential Risks:  
• There are no known or anticipated risks to you by participating in this research. 
However, you may experience stress in discussing some matter depending upon 
your own experiences with the energy sector. 
• If you do become stressed or emotional you have the right to terminate the 
interview at any time. 
 
Potential Benefits:  
• The research is beneficial to society by building an understanding of impacts and 
benefits of the energy sector in people’s lived experience. 
• Should you agree, your personal interview may be archived for the public to view. 
 
Confidentiality:  
• You are being asked to participate in this project as a named interview subject. 
Anonymity can be provided if you request it. 
• We will store your data for at least five years on a password-protected computer or in a 
locked filing cabinet. 
 
Right to Withdraw:   
• Your participation is voluntary and you can answer only those questions that you are 
comfortable with.  You may withdraw from the research project for any reason, at any 
time without explanation or penalty of any sort. 
• Should you wish to withdraw, we will not use your data. 
• Your right to withdraw data from the study will apply until results have been 
disseminated. After this date, it is possible that some form of research dissemination will 
have already occurred and it may not be possible to withdraw your data. 
 
Follow up:  
• To obtain results from the study, please contact Dr. Clint Westman at 
clint.westman@usask.ca or at 306-966-4179. 
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Questions or Concerns:   
• Contact Dr. Clint Westman at clint.westman@usask.ca or at 306-966-4179; 
• This research project has been approved on ethical grounds by the University of 
Saskatchewan Research Ethics Board.  Any questions regarding your rights as a 
participant may be addressed to that committee through the Research Ethics Office 
ethics.office@usask.ca (306) 966-2975. Out of town participants may call toll free (888) 
966-2975. 
 
Your signature below indicates that you have read and understand the description provided; I 
have had an opportunity to ask questions and my/our questions have been answered. I consent 
to participate in the research project. A copy of this Consent Form has been given to me for my 
records. 
 
     
Name of Participant  Signature  Date 
 
              _____________________________        _______________ 
Researcher’s Signature          Date 
 
A copy of this consent will be left with you, and a copy will be taken by the researcher. 
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Appendix C: Interview Guide 
 
I have asked you here in hopes that you’ll share with me your experiences in energy development 
in Northern Alberta. I want to learn about your experiences and views on the management of 
energy development in the area.  
I’d like to take some notes as I go to help me better recall what you’ve said. If I may have your 
permission, I would also like to tape this interview so that I can go over it later and not be glued 
to my notebook as we talk. Would that be OK? 
While I’m assisting Mikisew’s GIR office for the summer, I’m conducting this interview in an 
independent capacity, as a Master’s student at the University of Saskatchewan. Know that you 
can end the interview at any time, and you can choose whether or not your identity is attached to 
what you share here today – I’ll assume you’d like to remain anonymous, unless you tell me 
otherwise.  
Also, please remember that there is no right answer. Any details you can offer would help me 
better understand your experience and lived realities locally.  
 
Personal experience 
Can you tell me a bit about how you’ve engaged with energy development in Northern Alberta? 
 What is your involvement in managing energy development in Northern Alberta?28 
 What led to you taking this role? 
 How does your profession influence your views on energy development? 
How have you seen energy development, and its political management, change in recent years? 
How do you find industry – government – community relations have changed in recent years? 
Can you tell me what aspect(s) of energy development and its management concerns you most? 
A growing concern seems to be reclamation in the oil sands. Increasing attention is being paid to 
tailings management, end pit lakes, and reclamation more broadly. Can you tell me a bit about 
reclamation? 
In terms of natural resource extraction in Alberta, what do you believe is in the public interest? 
 How is the public interest identified regarding energy development? 
 
MCFN-specific questions (reserved for those directly engaging with the Mikisew) 
Can you tell me how social and cultural knowledge of the MCFN and/or other Indigenous 
communities comes to play in your work? 
Can you tell me how the MCFN is represented as a community and social group in negotiating 
energy development? 
 Can you elaborate in describing some of the ways in which the MCFN community is 
represented with government and industry? 
What do you know about other Indigenous communities’ experiences with energy development? 
 How do you feel the MCFN experience with energy development differs compared to 
nearby Indigenous communities? 
 What about Indigenous communities elsewhere in Canada? 
 And non-Indigenous communities?                                                         28 N.B. The questions in italics constitute rephrasing or additional prompts of the primary 
interrogation made, and will be used with my discretion as additional details or clarity is 
required.  
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The process of negotiating energy development  
What do you think constitutes good governance?  
 Are there Indigenous-specific views of good governance? Can you describe them, if so?  
What do you see as meaningful consultation? 
 Can you give me an example of meaningful consultation? 
 What are the greatest barriers to meaningful consultation? 
During the lifetime of a proposed project, from its emergence as an idea to its end of life, can you 
tell me what meaningful consultation would look like? 
o (a blank, sparsely illustrated timeline will be presented to the informant, and filled 
out during this exchange as a means of allowing the informant to expand as needed 
and fact-check throughout.) 
What do you see as the strongest means for local communities to control and affect change in 
managing energy development?  
Could you sort a list of strategies undertaken by Indigenous communities in terms of their strength 
in supporting community interests? 
- lobbying and advocacy work (re policy + particular projects) 
- consultation procedures of government 
- negotiation with industry (ex IBAs, MOUs) 
- litigation strategies  
- other?        
o (these will be offered visually so that the informant may manually sort these according 
to their views) 
Can you explain some of the differences between working with industry versus working with 
government, when negotiating energy development? 
So if you were telling a friend about lessons you have learned in your work in energy 
development, what would you share? 
Can you identify any best practices when energy development negotiations occur between 
Indigenous communities, government and industry? 
 
The broader socio-political context 
What comes to mind when I mention reconciliation in Canada? 
 Can you reflect upon the growing attention being given to the idea of reconciliation? 
Do you want to share any thoughts on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples?  
 How about how people in Canada – such as policy makers or Indigenous actors – have 
responded to the Declaration? 
How do you think reconciliation and UNDRIP connect to energy development (and consultation) 
here in Northern Alberta? 
 
Conclusion 
As I wrap up my questions, is there anything you’d like to add to our conversation? 
 Do you have any final comments for me? 
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Appendix D: Professional Network Analysis Data 
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Appendix D. Professional experience of individuals engaged in energy governance in Alberta 
(sourced from meeting notes and public LinkedIn profiles). 
N.B. Tertiary firms such, as contractors directly hired by industry, community or government 
offices, were categorized according to the sector they served (e.g., ancillary services for industry 
was categorized as I.) 
